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Abstract  
 
The aim of the Wilmar project is to investigate technical and economical pro-
blems related to large-scale deployment of renewable sources and to develop a 
modelling tool that can handle system simulations for a larger geographical re-
gion with an International power exchange. Wilmar is an abbreviation of “Wind 
Power Integration in Liberalised Electricity Markets”. The project was started 
in 2002 and is funded by the EU’s 5th Research programme on energy and envi-
ronment. Risø National Laboratory is co-ordinator of the project and partners 
include SINTEF, Kungliga Tekniska Högskola, University of Stuttgart, VTT, 
Nord Pool Consult, Technical University of Denmark, ELSAM A/S and  
Elkraft-System A/S.  
This report is Deliverable 3.2 of the project. The report describes the power 
markets in the Nordic countries and Germany, together with the market models 
to be implemented in the Wilmar Planning modelling tool developed in the pro-
ject. The starting points for the design of the power market models are the func-
tioning of the electricity markets in Germany and in the Nordic countries, Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These two power markets are thoroughly 
described in the first part of the report. A qualitative description of the power 
market models used in Wilmar is given in the second part, though the mathe-
matical presentations of the models are left out of this report and will be treated 
in a later publication from the project.  
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Preface 
This report is Deliverable 3.2 of the EU project “Wind Power Integration in Liber-
alised Electricity Markets” (WILMAR). The report describes the power markets in 
the Nordic countries and Germany, together with the market model suggested im-
plementing in the Wilmar Planning modelling tool developed in the project. The 
aim of the Wilmar project is to investigate the technical and economical problems 
related to large-scale deployment of renewable sources and to develop a modelling 
tool that can handle system simulations for a larger geographical region with an 
International power exchange. When finalised, the model will be available to ac-
tors within the power sector, including power system operators, energy authorities, 
power producers and other potential investors within this field. 
 
The report is not intended to give a full documentation of the Planning model, but 
concentrate on describing the ideas and assumptions behind the representation of 
the market place in the Planning model. A later Deliverable (D6.2) will give a full 
documentation of the Planning model.   
 
The report is edited by Poul Erik Morthorst, Risoe, based on contributions from 
Risoe National Laboratory, IER University of Stuttgart and the Technical Univer-
sity of Denmark. 
Risø-R-1441 (EN)  5 
1 The Wilmar Project 
1.1 Introduction  
 
In 2002, the European Union ratified the Kyoto protocol and thus the member 
states and the EU have committed themselves to a common greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction of 8% by the years 2008-12 compared with 1990. By now, both the 
member countries and the EU already have or are in the process of adopting poli-
cies of GHG-limitations in accordance with the agreed burden sharing in EU and 
the development of renewable energy resources is expected to play an important 
role in the implementation of these GHG-targets.  
 
In the White Paper on a strategy for the development of renewable energy, the EU 
Commission has launched a goal of covering 12% of the European Union’s gross 
inland energy consumption by the year 2010 by renewable sources, i.e., mainly by 
biomass, hydro power, wind energy and solar energy. Next to biomass, wind en-
ergy is foreseen to be the main contributor with regard to future importance (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997). Furthermore, the European Commission has agreed on a 
directive on the promotion of renewable energy technologies (European Commis-
sion, 2000), including a proposal on the share of renewables in the individual 
member states in 2010, based on the percentage of each country’s consumption of 
electricity. Although not binding, these targets are by now accepted by the EU 
member states. Thus, the directive signals the need to include renewable energy 
technologies as one of the serious options in achieving the targets for GHG-
reductions. 
 
In parallel with the implementation of the Kyoto GHG –commitments, a number of 
countries are liberalising their electricity industry. The cornerstone in liberalisation 
is the opening of the electricity markets for trade, both within the country and 
among countries. To generate efficient competition, unbundling of the power in-
dustry might be necessary: to split existing companies into independent ones for 
production, transmission and distribution of electricity. Finally, in order to handle 
the dispatch of electricity, an independent systems operator is needed, and estab-
lishing a power exchange might facilitate and increase transparency in trading.  
 
This process towards liberalised electricity markets has been going on for some 
years. The EU directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity 
states that each member state has the right of access to the electricity transmission 
and distribution grids, thus opening the concept of free electricity trade in Europe. 
A number of countries already have or are in the transition phase of liberalising 
their electricity industry. Electricity exchange markets are being developed to fa-
cilitate electricity trade and now exist in several countries; among these are Ger-
many, the Netherlands, England, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. How 
wind power is to be integrated into the competitive electri-city market is still an 
open question. At present, most renewable energy technologies are not economi-
cally competitive to conventional power producing plants. Thus, it can be expected 
that this will halt the development of new renewable capacity if renewables must 
compete on pure market conditions. 
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1.2 Intermittence and Power Systems Integration 
 
The introduction of large amounts of intermitting renewable power production such 
as wind power might interfere negatively with the technical and economical per-
formance of the power system: 
 
• If power from intermitting sources in periods exceeds the local/regional power 
demand congestion of transmissions, lines might cause technical instability of 
the power system; 
• Fluctuating and difficult predictable power production from intermitting 
sources requires additional regulatory capabilities of the conventional power 
system, implying extra costs; 
• Large amounts of wind power with low marginal costs might have consider-
able impact upon the functioning of the power spot market, including volatility 
of spot prices. 
 
The reality of these problems is already encountered in the Northern part of 
Europe, where systems operators are facing grid-instability problems during peri-
ods of heavy wind, and the development of wind power is expected to continue. In 
recent years, a number of European countries have experienced a fast growth in the 
installation of wind turbines, e.g., Germany, Spain and Denmark. In all likelihood, 
this fast growth rate of wind power will continue in the years to come, which is 
also reflected in the 40000 MW target for wind power in 2010 in EU, put forward 
in the White Paper on renewables from the European Commission. 
 
This fast expansion of wind power is to be introduced in electricity markets that are 
undergoing a process of market liberalisation as mentioned above. A consequence 
of the liberalisation is that the dispatch of the power plants in the electricity sys-
tems are increasingly being controlled by trading on power pools, as it is seen in a 
number of European countries: England, Poland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Spain and the Netherlands. 
 
The other units must counteract fluctuations in the wind power production in the 
power system to maintain the stability of the power system. Therefore, larger 
amounts of wind power will require the presence of larger amounts of frequency-
responding spinning power reserve1 and supplemental power reserve2 in the power 
system compared to a situation without wind power. The introduction of wind 
power, therefore, put strains on the performance of the other power-producing units 
in the electricity system.  
 
On the economical side, the introduction of substantial amounts of wind power will 
influence the price on the spot market, because the marginal production price of 
wind power is very low (mainly operation and maintenance costs). The average 
price level on the regulating power market is expected to increase, because the un-
predictability of wind power will cause trading of larger amounts of supplemental 
power compared to a situation without wind power. The handling of the technical 
impacts will, in some cases, be associated with an extra cost, as in the case of dedi-
cated wind power integration measures such as reinforcement of transmission grids 
                                                     
1 The frequency-responding spinning power reserve in a power system is (normally large) power 
plants that respond with fast, automatic changes in their power production to changes in the elec-
trical frequency of the grid. 
2 The supplemental power reserve is power plants that can adjust their power production within 15 
minutes. The system operator activates them manually.  
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or construction of electricity storages. The way these integration costs are distrib-
uted to the actors on the electricity market will have an economical impact thereon.  
1.3 Objectives of Wilmar 
Wilmar is an abbreviation of “Wind Power Integration in Liberalised Electri-city 
Markets”. The project was started in 2002 and is funded by the EU’s 5th Research 
programme on energy and environment. Risø National Laboratory is co-ordinator 
of the project and partners include SINTEF, Kungliga Tekniska Högskola, Univer-
sity of Stuttgart, VTT, Nord Pool Consult, Technical University of Denmark, 
ELSAM A/S and Elkraft-System A/S. 
 
The aim of the Wilmar project is to investigate the above-mentioned technical and 
economical problems related to large-scale deployment of renewable sources and 
to develop a modelling tool that can handle system simulations for a larger geo-
graphical region with an International power exchange. When finalised, the model 
will be available to actors within the power sector, including power system opera-
tors, energy authorities, power producers and other potential investors within this 
field. 
 
Thus, the objectives of the Wilmar project are: 
 
1. To develop a strategic planning tool to analyse the integration of renewable 
power technologies to be applied by system operators, power producers, poten-
tial investors in renewable technologies and energy authorities; 
2. To analyse the technical impacts connected to the introduction of substantial 
amounts of wind power in the Northern part of the European electricity system 
– covering the Nordic countries plus Germany. The issues of system stability 
connected to the fast (below 10 minutes) fluctuations in the wind power pro-
duction will be analysed, as well as the issues of achieving an hour-per-hour 
power balance in the electricity system. Also, the long-term issue of securing 
the energy balance irrespective of the variation in the wind power and hydro-
power production from year to year will be analysed; 
3. To analyse the performance of different integration measures in a liberalised 
electricity system. Both possibilities for integrating fluctuating power produc-
tion by optimising the interaction of the existing units in a given electricity sys-
tem, the possibilities lying in power exchange between regions, and the per-
formance of dedicated integration technologies such as electricity storages, will 
be evaluated. Special attention will be given to interactions between the inte-
gration measures and the organisation of the power pool. 
4. To quantify the costs connected to the integration of large shares of wind 
power in a liberalised electricity system, i.e., to answer the question, what does 
it cost to integrate a certain amount of wind power in a liberalised energy  
system? 
1.4 The Aim of this Report 
The modelling and simulation efforts of the Wilmar project are divided into two 
parts. One part consists of an investigation of the issue of system stability, i.e., the 
wind integration aspects connected to the fast (below 10 minutes) fluctuations in 
wind power production, with the use of dedicated power system simulation tools. It 
includes the analysis of a number of case studies, especially selected for large-scale 
integration of renewable energy generation and with expected potential stability 
problems. 
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In the second part, the wind integration ability of large electricity systems with 
substantial amounts of power trade in power pools is investigated. With the starting 
point in existing models, an hour-per-hour simulation model is deve-loped, and this 
modelling tool is used to investigate the technical and cost issues of integrating 
large amounts of wind power into the electricity system. The model will cover the 
two power pools: Nord Pool and European Power Exchange, i.e., Germany, Den-
mark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The developed model will be tested by differ-
ent end-users, e.g., systems operators and power producers, who are expected to be 
users of the final model as well.  
 
This report is especially related to the second part of the project. The starting points 
for the design of the power market models are the functioning of the electricity 
markets in Germany and in the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. These two power markets are thoroughly described in Section 2 and 3 of 
this report. A qualitative description of the power market models used in Wilmar is 
given in Section 4, though the mathematical presentations of the models are left out 
of this report and will be treated in a later publication from the project.  
 
The intention of the report is not to give a full documentation of the Planning 
model, but to concentrate on describing the ideas and assumptions behind the rep-
resentation of the power markets to be included in the modelling tool. Full docu-
mentation of the Planning model will be given in Deliverable D6.2 to be published 
at a later stage of the project. 
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2 The Nordic Power Market  
2.1 Markets of Importance to Power Trade in the 
Nordic Area 
 
The Nord Pool power exchange is geographically bound to Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark. The market was established in 1991 and until the end of 
1995, the electricity exchange covered Norway only. From 1996, Sweden joined 
the exchange and the name was changed to Nord Pool. In 1998, Finland was in-
cluded and Denmark3 joined in 1999-2000. At present, the market is dominated by 
Norwegian and Swedish hydropower, though power trade with neighbouring Ger-
man markets are increasing and thus reducing the hydropower dominance. Because 
Denmark is situated on the border between the large conventional fossil fuel-based 
power systems of central Europe (especially Germany) and the hydro-dominated 
Nordic system, Denmark has the role as a sort of buffer between these systems. 
This implies that the price of power in the Danish area is partly related to the Nor-
dic market and partly to the German one, depending on the situation in these mar-
kets.  
 
The geographical boundaries of the Nord Pool power market are shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: The geographical boundaries of the Nordic power market. Transmission 
capacities shown in MW. Source: NordEl.  
                                                     
3  Within the Nord Pool, Denmark is separated into two independent parts covering the Jutland/Funen 
area and Zealand, including the small neighbouring islands. These two parts are not directly elec-
trically connected and, therefore, constitute two specific pricing areas in the market. 
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Three main principles characterise the liberalised Nordic power market. These 
principles are often seen as being fundamental for the creating of a well-
functioning liberalised electricity market. In short, the principles concern the provi-
sion of: 
 
• Equal opportunities for all actors to access the transmission grid and the setting 
up of independent TSO’s to carry the responsibility for system balance and 
functioning. The TSO’s must offer fair and neutral balancing services; 
• Transmission tariff systems that must be unequivocal, transparent and non-
discriminatory; 
• Effective regulation power and balance markets sustained by the TSO’s for 
enabling and maintaining reliable system operation and effective settling of ac-
tor imbalances. 
 
In general, a number of markets exist servicing the Nordic power system. Most of 
these markets link directly to the physical delivery of electricity from producers to 
consumers and to the physical stability of the power transmission and distribution 
system to support the deliveries. Furthermore, other markets exist which facilitate 
or service the physical markets, e.g., concerning the handling of financial risks. Not 
all of these markets are implemented in all the Nordic countries and some markets 
may overlap in the type of service they provide. These markets are listed below and 
described briefly:  
 
At present, markets for physical trade (NordEl, 2000):   
 
• Bilateral Electricity Trade or OTC (over the counter) Trading  
This trade is outside the Nord Pool exchange, and prices and amounts are not 
publicised. Import/export transmission issues related to bilateral trade among 
Nord Pool price areas are handled by Nord Pool. 
 
• Elspot Market  
Physical markets at the Nord Pool where prices and amounts are based on sup-
ply and demand. Resulting prices and the overall amounts traded are publi-
cised. The spot market is a day ahead-market where bidding closes at noon for 
deliveries from midnight and 24 hours ahead. Hourly supply and demand is 
traded, but the market further supports block bidding, where supply and de-
mand during linked hours may be traded as units. In 2002, the volume traded in 
Elspot represented about 32% of overall consumption in the Nordic region. 
   
• Elbas Market 
Physical trading of adjusting/regulating power where bidding closes 1 hour be-
fore the operating/delivery hour. Elbas functions as an aftermarket to the El-
spot market at Nord Pool and the Nord Pool maintains the Elbas market. The 
products traded are one-hour-long power contracts. Prices are publicised and 
based on supply and demand. Presently, Elbas comprises Finland and Sweden 
only, but extending Elbas is being considered.  
 
• Regulating Power Market (RPM) 
Physical real time market covering operation within the hour. The main func-
tion of the RPM is to provide power regulation to counteract imbalances rela-
tive to planned operation according to the Elspot market trade. Only TSO’s 
constitute the demand side at this market. Approved actors on the supply side 
of the RPM can be both electricity producers and consumers. 
 
The RPM may be subdivided according to the different services provided, e.g., 
according to the response time for the regulation delivery. Secondary control 
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and tertiary control capacity differs according to the response time for the ca-
pacity to be online. 
 
• Balancing Markets  
Linked to the RPM. Concerns the later settling of actor imbalances recorded 
during the past 24 hour period of operation. Only the TSO for the area acts on 
the supply side for settling imbalances. Actors with imbalances on the spot 
market are price takers on the RPM/balance market. Thus, the TSO’s act as the 
intermediary between suppliers of power regulation (at the RPM) and actors in 
demand of balance (being settled at the balance market). 
 
Apart from these market structures, fewer formal markets exist where important 
physical deliverables or power system support services are traded. A general head-
ing for these markets could be:  
 
• Auxiliary Service Markets/Ancillary Delivery Agreements 
The function of these markets/agreements is to provide/allocate, for example, 
primary, secondary and tertiary reserves for safe operation of the system within 
the operating hour, including frequency and voltage control. Furthermore, the 
needs for reserve capacity to counteract larger operation disturbances (e.g., due 
to plant or grid failure) and black start reserves, etc., are generally allocated via 
individual agreements between selected actors and the TSO. Presently, these 
(informal) markets are characterised by a few large actors within an area taking 
part on the supply side and the TSO on the demand side. 
 
Auxiliary services cover a number of aspects relating to the physical function-
ing of the power system, which may be looked upon as (or split into) a number 
of different markets, each covering partly interrelated products. 
 
• Cross Border Transmission Capacity Auction Market  
Within the Nordic system, allocation of cross border transmission capacity cor-
responding to the power trade is governed or administered by Nord Pool. The 
Nordic TSO’s have handed over the administration of grid bottlenecks within 
the Nordel system to Nord Pool and grid capacities are by doing this utilised to 
their maximum. Nord Pool handles bottlenecks via so-called implicit auction 
(or one stop shopping) where the power trading and the transmission capacity 
auction are combined into one transaction. This system allows actors to trade 
via the common exchange without considering the transmission capacities ex-
plicitly. However, capacity for cross border transmission (import/export) 
to/from the Nordic power system is still traded via specific auctions or bilateral 
trade of transmission channels.  
 
Other and non-physical market concerns:   
 
• Eltermin  
Financial market supported by Nord Pool that handles, e.g., economic risk of 
actors. The market includes future and forward markets. 
 
However, other markets relating to the Nordic power system may further emerge in 
the future. Such new considered markets are, e.g., markets for:  
 
• TGC (Tradable Green Certificates) (Not implemented); 
• GHG Emission Quota Market (Not implemented). 
 
Moreover, new markets that enables diversified price settling of deliveries pres-
ently covered via more ‘informal bulk markets’ could be relevant, e.g.:  
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• Market for reserve capacity. (Not implemented); 
• Markets for specified ancillary services to the grid (e.g., concerning frequency 
and voltage control reserves and black start). (Not implemented). 
 
The main focus in this report will be on the physical markets that govern and im-
pact the overall functioning of the power system. The Elspot market and the Regu-
lating Power market are presently most important although other markets may di-
rectly or indirectly influence these two physical markets. The two markets (when 
fully developed) determine the basic dispatch of supply actors in the system and 
conditions for actors on the demand side, which ultimately may to some degree 
influence power consumption patterns.  
 
The Elbas market may develop and become important in the future. It may eventu-
ally take over the trade at the Elspot market and elements from the Regulating 
power market due to its low minimum lead-time before delivery. The potential 
structures of future markets are generally, of course, very important for the func-
tioning of power systems and the technical and economical efficiency of the  
systems.  
 
The technical possibilities4 for creating well functioning markets may to a large 
extent determine the type of actors that are present at the markets, the number of 
actors and the minimum volumes, or amount being traded, etc., and the transaction 
cost for handling markets. Likewise, such technical possibilities may to a large ex-
tent determine the supply at markets such as the Regulating Power market or po-
tential markets covering ancillary services. In particular, an increased supply at the 
Regulating Power market may reduce costs at this market and/or may increase the 
capability of the overall system as to accumulate non-flexible production (and con-
sumption). This is, of course, important, e.g., in relation to the integration of wind 
power due to its fluctuation and limited predictability.  
 
Thus, the ability of the market to mobilise flexibility in the overall system and con-
sequently to, for example, increase the supply of regulating power (both from the 
supply and the demand side of the system) is important. It is important for the eco-
nomic performance or efficiency of the system and it is important for the capability 
of the system as to integrate power supplies of limited flexibility such as wind 
power, photo-voltaic, production at firm base load plants, etc. 
 
As mentioned above, two markets within the Nordic power region are of special 
importance for wind power: The electricity spot market and the combined power 
regulating and balancing markets, where the spot market is the central energy mar-
ket and the regulating market comes into force, if the bids to the spot market are 
not fulfilled. In the following, these two markets will be described in more detail. 
2.2 The Nord Pool Spot Market 
 
The Bidding Procedure 
 
The Nord Pool spot market is a day-ahead market, where the price of power is de-
termined by supply and demand. Power producers and consumers give their bids to 
                                                     
4 For example, two-way communication systems at the consumption side of the power system. 
Risø-R-1441 (EN)  13 
the market 12 to 36 hours in advance, stating quantities of electricity supplied or 
demanded and the corresponding price. Then, for each hour, the price that clears 
the market (equalises supply with demand) is determined at the Nord Pool power 
exchange. In principle, all power producers and consumers can trade at the ex-
change today, but in reality, only big consumers (distribution and trading compa-
nies and large industries) and generators act on the market, while the small ones 
form trading co-operatives (as is the case for wind turbines) or engage with larger 
traders to act on their behalf. A minor part of total electricity production is actually 
traded at the spot market. The majority is sold on long-term contracts, but the de-
termined spot prices have a considerable impact on prices agreed in these contracts 
(Morthorst, 2003). 
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Figure 2: Supply and demand curve for the Nord 
Pool power exchange. 
 
Figure 2 shows a typical example of an annual supply and a demand curve for the 
Nordic power system. As shown, the bids from hydro and wind power enter the 
supply curve at the lowest level owing to their low marginal costs, followed by 
combined heat and power plants, while condensing plants are those with the high-
est marginal costs of power production. In general, the demand for power is highly 
inelastic, mainly Norwegian and Swedish electro-boilers and power intensive  
industry contributing to price elasticity in power demand. 
 
If trade of power can flow freely in the Nordic area, i.e., no congestions of trans-
mission lines between the areas are observed, then only one price will exist at the 
market. But if the required power trade cannot be handled physically due to trans-
mission constraints, the market is split into a number of submarkets. These sub-
markets are defined by pricing areas, for example, Denmark is split into two pric-
ing areas (Jutland/Funen and Zealand). Thus, if more power was to be produced in 
the Jutland/Funen area than consumption and transmission capacity could cover, 
this area would constitute a sub-market, where supply and demand would be equal-
ised at a lower price than the one existing at the general Nord Pool market.  
 
Pricing in Nord Pool 
In a system dominated by hydropower, the spot price is heavily influenced by the 
precipitation in the area. This is shown in Figure 3 below, where the price ranges 
between a maximum of 350 NKR/MWh (approximately 42€/MWh) to close to 
zero. Thus, there were very wet periods in 1992 and 1993 and similarly in 1995 
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and 1998, although to a lesser extent. Dry periods dominated 1994 and the begin-
ning of 1995, but a long period with precipitation significantly below the expected 
level was especially experienced in 1996. 
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Figure 3: Price of power in the Nordic market in the period 1991-1999, Norwegian 
kr. 
Looking at the last two years – the period where Denmark participated in the Nor-
dic power exchange – prices have been fairly stable (cf. Figure 4), excluding the 
end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003.  
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Figure 4: Power prices at the Nord Pool market in 
2001, 2002 and the beginning of 2003, weekly av-
erage DKK/MWh (exchange rate 1€ = 7.45 DKK). 
Source: Nord Pool 2003. 
The average price in 2001 and 2002 was approximately 2.5 c€/kWh, ranging be-
tween 1.5 c€/kWh and 8.8 c€/kWh. The Autumn of 2002 was, however, very dry in 
Norway and Sweden, which has heavily influenced prices in October, November 
and December 2002 and likewise in January 2003. Thus, if the last three months of 
2002 are excluded from the considered period of time, the price ranged between 
1.5 c€/kWh and 3.3 c€/kWh. But the draught in Norway and Sweden implied that 
prices rose to a high of more than 10 c€/kWh. Normality in power prices at the 
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Nordic market did not return before the Spring of 2003, due to the importance of 
hydropower. But high prices are only part of the abnormality of the present power 
market. As shown in Figure 4, the system price and the two area prices for Den-
mark West and East, respectively, are normally closely related, implying that con-
gestions in the transmission-system seldom have major impacts upon price-
determination. But this close relationship seems to have vanished at the end of 
2002 and beginning of 2003, where prices in the Western Danish area differ quite 
considerably from the system prices, mainly owing to the high level of wind power 
penetration in this area.  
Case Study for Western Denmark 
Experience on the integration of wind power in a small area, Jutland/Funen in 
Denmark, will be analysed in the following, as a case study. This area, the Western 
part of Denmark, has a number of specific characteristics (ELTRA, 2003): 
• It has a very high share of wind-produced energy – in 2002, almost 20% of 
total power consumption was covered by wind power. Presently, most of wind-
generated power is covered by prioritised dispatch; 
• It has a high share of decentralised combination of heat and power, which is 
paid according to a three-level tariff and is also covered by prioritised dispatch; 
• It lies on the border between the fossil fuel-based German power system and 
the hydropower dominated Nordic system and is thus heavily influenced by 
both areas. 
In the following, it will be further investigated how well wind power actually is 
integrated into the power system in Western Denmark given those conditions men-
tioned above 56. 
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Figure 5: Wind-generated power and decentralised power as a percentage of total 
power consumption on an hourly basis in December 2002, Jutland/Funen area of 
Denmark.  
                                                     
5 If large amounts of wind power in the long-term are introduced into the power system, it might be 
expected that the marginal power price would in general decrease. This effect is not analysed in 
this paper, where only the short run consequences of large amounts of wind-produced power are 
taken into consideration. 
6 In general, input data for the analyses performed in Section 3 and 4 are published on (ELTRA, 
2003). 
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Figure 5 shows the share of wind-generated electricity in total power consumption 
in the Jutland/Funen area in December 2002. This month is chosen because it had 
on average the highest contribution by wind power, totalling 33% of domestic elec-
tricity consumption supplied by wind power that month. As shown, the share is 
close to 100% at certain points in time, indicating that all power consumption at 
that time could be supplied by wind power in this area. As mentioned above, a 
large part of the power generated by wind turbines is still covered by priority dis-
patch in Denmark, whilst this is also the case for power produced by decentralised 
combined heat and power plants. This implies that these producers do not react on 
the price signals from the spot market – wind producers under priority dispatch are 
paid the feed-in tariff for everything they produce, while decentralised CHP plants 
are paid according to a three-level tariff, highest in the daytime and lowest in the 
night-time. Thus, the last-mentioned ones will only produce at the low tariff if 
there is a need to fill the heat storages up. Therefore, total prioritised production 
was higher in Denmark for quite a number of hours in December than domestic 
power demand, thus adding to the problem of congestion of transmission lines. 
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Figure 6: Deviations between the system price of 
Nord Pool and the price of power in Western 
Denmark. 
 
The consequences are clearly shown in Figure 6, where deviations between the 
Nord Pool system price and the realised price in Western Denmark are depicted. As 
shown in a large number of hours, the Western Denmark price is significantly be-
low the System price. 
 
Therefore, a fairly strong relationship is found in this December case between the 
amount of wind power produced and a lower power price of the Western Denmark 
price compared to the general Nord Pool System price. This relationship is shown 
in Figure 7, where the domestic power consumption minus the generated wind 
power is plotted against the deviations between the spot price of Western Denmark 
and the System price. Thus, a high value at the horizontal axis indicates a small 
wind power production and thus only a small negative impact on the power price in 
Western Denmark. A small value at the horizontal axis indicates a high wind power 
production and, therefore, a high negative impact on the power price in Western 
Denmark. The regression line shown in Figure 7 is statistically significant and de-
termined with an R2 of 0.65 – not a strong relation, but still significant. Thus, this 
Risø-R-1441 (EN)  17 
result shows that when fairly large amounts of wind power and power from decen-
tralised CHP-plants are introduced to the market in December 2002, a considerable 
short-term impact upon the market price in Western-Denmark is found. 
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Figure 7: Is there a relation between a high share of consumption covered by wind 
power and the price at the market? Domestic power consumption minus the pro-
duction of wind power plotted against the difference between the West-Denmark 
spot price and the system price, hours in December 2002.  
 
The strong relationship in December is not found again when looking at the other 
months of 2002. The same story is partly found for November, but not as strong – 
the relationship is determined with an R2 of 0.32, which is insignificant. In no other 
month of 2002 has any significant relationship been found, i.e., it seems that for 
most of year 2002, the power system and market are, in general, capable of han-
dling the wind-generated power without heavily influencing the spot market price 
in the short-term. 
 
Thus, the results from these relatively few examples give a scattered picture. 
Though no strong conclusions can be drawn, it seems nevertheless relevant to em-
phasis the following issues: 
 
• There is a tendency that more wind power in the system leads in the short-term 
to relatively lower spot prices, while less wind power implies relatively higher 
spot prices, although with the exemption of December 2002 where no strong 
relationship is generally found.  
 
• Large amounts of wind power in the short run do not by itself imply large 
negative impacts upon the spot power price. In the Danish system, power pro-
duced by CHP plants are treated in the same way as wind power (prioritised) 
and, therefore, has the same impacts. If CHP plants were not treated as priori-
tised dispatch, more wind could in the short run be expectedly handled by the 
system. 
 
• The situation at the end of 2002 with lower prices in Western Denmark com-
pared to the rest of the Nordic market does not have a simple explanation. 
Though the capacity of wind has increased slightly during the year, less wind-
produced electricity was actually supplied to the power system compared to 
February 2002. Thus, too much wind-generated power is not the only obstacle. 
Part of the answer could be that in periods with generally high spot prices, the 
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power systems and market are stressed; transmission capacity is in shortage 
because everybody is eager to export to Sweden and Norway at this high price. 
Thus, during periods with high spot prices, system interactions might make it 
more difficult and expensive to handle wind power.  
 
• Many partly exogenous factors are influencing the price determination at the 
spot market in the short-term, including weather conditions (temperature), if 
the capacity of transmission lines is constrained for other reasons and what are 
the price conditions in our neighbouring countries. Therefore, it is difficult to 
single out one factor to be the most important one influencing the spot power 
price in the short run. 
2.3 The Nordic Regulating and Balancing Market 
The Functioning of the Regulating and Balancing Markets 
Imbalances relative to the physical trade on the spot market must be levelled out in 
order to maintain equality between production and consumption and to maintain 
power grid stability. Deviations from the bids at the spot market for all actors add 
up to the net imbalance at the hour for the overall grid. In case of bottlenecks in the 
grid, the overall market degenerates into regions, or areas, and balance must be es-
tablished in each such area. The main tool for correcting such imbalances, which 
provides the necessary physical trade and accounting in the liberalised Nordic elec-
tricity system, is called the Regulating market. 
 
The Regulating Power market and the Balancing market may be regarded as only 
one market, where the TSO acts as an important intermediate or facilitator between 
supply and demand of power regulation. The TSO is the responsible body for se-
curing the system functioning in a region. Within its region, the TSO controls and 
manages the grid, and to this end, the combined Regulating Power and Balancing 
market is an important tool for managing the balance and grid stability (NordEl, 
2002).  
 
The basic principle for settling imbalances is that actors causing or contributing to 
the imbalance shall accordingly pay their share of the costs for re-establishing the 
balance.  
 
Settling of imbalances among countries has since September 2002 been done based 
on common rules for the Nordic countries (NordEl decision). However, the settling 
of imbalances within a region differs from country to country. Work is being done 
to analyse options for harmonising these rules, also for the Nordic countries. 
 
Thus, if the bids by generators and consumers to the spot market are not fulfilled, 
the regulating market has to come into force and this is especially important for 
wind-based power producers. The producers state bids on the regulating market 1-2 
hours before the actual production hour and power production from the bidding 
actors must be available within 15 minutes notice. For those reasons, only fast re-
sponding power capacity will normally be able to deliver regulating power. 
 
It will to a certain extent only normally be possible to predict the supply of wind 
power 12-36 hours in advance. Thus, it will be necessary to pay a premium for the 
difference between the sales bid to the spot market and the actual delivery to the 
market. Figure 8 shows how the regulatory market functions: If the power produc-
tion from, e.g., the wind turbines is higher than the bid, other producers will have 
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to regulate down or consumption must increase in order to maintain power balance. 
In this case, the wind producer will get a lower price for the excess electricity pro-
duced than the spot market price. If wind power production is lower than the bid, 
other producers will have to regulate up to secure the power supply, or consump-
tion must be reduced. These other producers will obtain a price above the spot 
market price for the extra electricity produced, an additional cost, which has to be 
borne by the wind producer. The more the wind producer is off track, the higher 
the premium is expected to be, as shown in Figure 8 by the difference from the 
regulatory curves to the stipulated spot market price. 
 
Regulation Up
Price
Spot market price
Down
 
Figure 8: The functioning of the regulatory market. 
 
Until the end of 2002, each country participating in the Nord Pool market had its 
own regulatory market. Thus, what is discussed above is fairly close to the Norwe-
gian way of handling the regulatory market. In Denmark, balancing was handled by 
agreements with the largest power producers, supplemented by possibilities of the 
TSO’s to buy balancing power from abroad if the domestic producers were too ex-
pensive or not able to produce the required volumes of regulatory power. A com-
mon Nordic regulatory market was established at the beginning of 2003 and both 
Danish areas are, as expected, going to participate in this market. 
 
In Norway, Sweden and Finland, all suppliers at the regulating market will receive 
the marginal price for power regulation at the specific hour. In Denmark, suppliers 
at the market get the price of their bid to the regulation market. Prices for up and 
down regulation form the basis for settling imbalances between areas and for set-
tling imbalances of the individual actors at the particular hour. If no overall regula-
tion has been required, the regulation price is placed equal to the system price. 
 
In case of no bottlenecks, the regulation price is the same in all areas. In case of 
bottlenecks to one or more areas, bids from these areas at the regulating market are 
not taken into account when forming the regulation price for the rest of the system, 
and the regulation price within the area will differ from the system regulation price. 
 
In Norway, only one regulation price is defined and this is used both for sales and 
purchase on the hour when settling imbalances of individual actors. In the other 
countries two prices are generally defined, a sales price and a purchase price, and 
these are used for settling imbalances of actors depending on the direction of their 
imbalance. The two-price system forms incentives for the actors for avoiding im-
balances to a larger extent than is the case in a one-price system. In the one-price 
system, there is always a monetary balance for the regulation at the hour, whereas 
in the two-price system, a surplus is generated for the TSO’s to cover expenses re-
lating to handling the balancing service. 
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When bids have to be stated to the spot market 12-36 hours in advance, it will not 
be possible for wind producers to fulfil this bid at all times. To get other power 
producers to regulate according to the unfulfilled part has a price, and with wind 
power gradually entering the spot market, this price will in the future have to be 
borne by the owners of wind power plants. Until the end of 2002, the TSO’s have 
been obliged to handle the regulation in Denmark, wind power being a prioritised 
dispatch. From the beginning of 2003, the owners of those turbines supplying the 
spot market are also financially responsible for balancing the power themselves. 
They can either continue to let the TSO’s handle the balancing and pay the associ-
ated costs, or they can hand over the work to private companies. In Denmark, some 
of the wind turbine owners have formed a co-operative for handling the spot mar-
ket trading and balancing of their turbines and this co-operative covers by now the 
majority of owners entering the spot market. 
 
Case Study: Wind Power and the Balancing Market 
But what quantities are actually regulated and what is the cost associated with the 
balancing of power production from wind turbines? In the following, the quantities 
and costs reported by the TSO for Jutland/Funen will for some specific periods be 
analysed in more detail. 
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Figure 9: Regression analysis of down or up regulation against the amount of wind 
power for the Jutland/Funen area. Hourly basis for January-February 2002. Based 
on data from (ELTRA, 2003). 
 
In Figure 9, a regression analysis is performed for the need to regulating up and 
down, respectively, against the produced quantity of wind power. The analysis is 
carried out for some specific periods of time for the Western part of Denmark, 
namely the Jutland/Funen area. The first two months of 2002 are analysed because 
of their high wind power production –wind power supplied approximately 24% of 
total power consumption in January 2002, while 33% was covered in February.  
 
Figure 9 shows the overall regulation capacity applied in the Jutland/Funen area on 
an hourly basis and plotted against the wind power production in the area for the 
same hours. An observation above the horizontal zero-line in the figure indicates 
that up-regulation is registered at that hour, while an observation below the zero-
line shows that capacity for regulating down is registered.  
 
As mentioned above, there will be a need for regulation when wind power cannot 
fulfil the bids given to the spot market. But other actors at the spot market might 
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also have a need for regulating power, due to changes in demand, such as power 
plants having to shut down, etc. In Figure 9, the capacities shown are related to to-
tal regulation, not only regulation undertaken due to wind power bids not being 
fulfilled7. Nevertheless, although not very significant, there is a clear tendency that 
the more wind power produced, the higher is the need for down-regulation. Corre-
spondingly, the less wind power produced, the higher is the need for up-regulation. 
Please observe that what is shown in Figure 9 is that the forecasts for wind-
produced energy tend to be too low, when much wind power is produced, and tend 
to be too high, when only small amounts of wind-generated power enter the sys-
tem. The reason is that the forecast is bounded between 0 and 100%. That means 
that a low forecast has an asymmetric potential for error, only a small overpredic-
tion is possible, but a large underprediction. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 shows the monthly quantities regulated (numerically) for 2002 in 
the Western part of Denmark as a percentage of the total power supply and as a 
percentage of the conventional power production only. The percentage relative to 
the conventional power supply is calculated, because these power plants are the 
ones being capable of regulating the power. As shown, the percentage of conven-
tional power production to be regulated can be rather high, especially during Sum-
mer-time. Please observe that the percentage to be regulated is not higher in the 
Autumn/Winter of 2002, indicating that wind power is not the only reason for the 
lower prices in the Western part of Denmark during December of that year, as dis-
cussed in the previous section. The average percentage being regulated in the year 
2002 is calculated to 5.6% of total power supply and to almost 10% of conven-
tional produced power. 
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Figure 10: The regulated quantities as percentages of total supply and of conven-
tional power production, respectively (monthly average). 
A wind turbine owner producing more than his bid will receive the spot price for 
all his production, but he will have to pay a premium for other power plants to 
regulate down, because his production is exceeding his bid. If he produces less than 
his bid, he will correspondingly have to pay a premium for the part other genera-
tors have to produce in up-regulation. The costs of regulation within the Jut-
land/Funen area of Denmark are shown on an hourly basis in Figure 11 for January 
and February 2002. Thus, the amounts of wind power produced at the specific hour 
are shown at the x-axis, while the cost per MWh of regulation is shown at the y-
axis.  
 
                                                     
7 It is not possible in the available data, to sort out the specific unfulfilment of wind power.  
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Figure 11: The cost of regulation in the Jutland/Funen area. Hourly basis for 
January-February 2002. 
The picture is quite clear with a “band” of costs, both for up and down regulation 
being almost independent of how much wind power is generated within the specific 
hour. Thus, although the need for regulation is increasing with higher quantities of 
wind power produced, the regulating costs are seen to be almost independent of the 
level of required regulation. The average cost of regulating up is calculated to 0.8 
c€/kWh regulated, while the cost of regulating down correspondingly amounts to 
0.6 c€/kWh regulated in the period January-February 2002.  
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Figure 12: The cost of regulation calculated as monthly averages for the year 2002 
in respect of the Jutland/Funen area.  
Figure 12 shows the regulation costs for the whole of 2002 calculated as monthly 
averages. As seen from the figure, the cost of up-regulation is constantly above the 
cost of down-regulation, probably because the marginal cost of up-regulation is 
higher for power producers than regulating down the production. Moreover, the 
cost of regulation – especially again up-regulation – is not surprisingly increasing 
with the general level of the spot price, which increased heavily towards the end of 
2002. For 2002, the average of up-regulation cost is calculated at 1.2 c€/kWh regu-
lated, while the cost of down regulation amounts to 0.7 c€/kWh regulated. 
 
As mentioned, the regulated quantities do not only relate to wind power, but also to 
the total system, including non-fulfilment of bids from demand and conventional 
power producers as well. But well-knowing that the estimate is an upper bound, the 
monthly regulation costs for the Western part of Denmark for 2002 are in Figure 13 
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only related to wind power. Furthermore, for comparison, the costs are in Figure 13 
correspondingly related to the total power supply. 
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Figure 13: Regulation costs calculated as monthly averages for the Jutland/Funen 
area for 2002, if costs are born by wind power only or are related to the total 
power supply. 
As shown in Figure 13, regulation costs per kWh born by wind power only are 
smallest in periods with plenty of wind-generated power, i.e. in the Winter/Spring 
of 2002, and higher in the Summer-time, where less wind power is produced. 
Again, the Autumn/Winter of 2002 with the high spot prices is seen to be an excep-
tion though. The average regulation cost if born by wind power only is calculated 
at 0.3 c€/kWh for the year 20028. As mentioned above, these estimates constitute 
an upper bound for the regulation costs for wind energy, because the regulated 
quantities not only relate to wind power. Of course, if the regulation costs are dis-
tributed across the total power supply, the costs per kWh are much lower, and if 
calculated as an average over 2002, the cost amounts to 0.05 c€/kWh.  
 
                                                     
8 If 2002 is a representative year for regulating, costs are not known. 
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3 The German Electricity Market  
3.1 Introduction 
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) is Germany’s energy exchange and thereby 
one of the biggest power markets in Continental Europe. EEX emerged in 2002 
from the merger of EEX Leipzig Power Exchange and EEX European Energy Ex-
change Frankfurt and is now located in Leipzig. Both exchanges initially started 
Spot Trading for physical contracts (Spot Market) in 2000. This so-called day-
ahead market includes daily trade for electricity delivered on the next day. In 2001, 
EEX Frankfurt also introduced trading of standardised financial contracts (Futures 
Market). The following sections are mainly based on EEX,2002a and 2003a for the 
Spot Market (cf. section 3.2), EEX,2002b and 2003b for the Futures Market  (cf. 
section 3.3) and Swider and Weber, 2003 a and b for the Regulating Power Mar-
kets (cf. section 3.4). 
3.2 The EEX Spot Market 
The EEX Spot Market’s main role is to facilitate the short-term trade of standard-
ised products. Thus, the trading participants will have the possibility to balance 
their purchase and sale obligations in the short run. Furthermore, EEX’s role is to 
promote the exchange of market information as well as the competition and the 
liquidity of the power market. The EEX Spot Market may be briefly characterised 
as follows: 
 
– The Spot Market concept is based on bids for purchase and sale in respect of 
hourly power contracts for the 24 hours of the following day and on bloc bids. 
– Trading is executed one day prior to physical delivery taking place. For this 
reason, the Spot Market is referred to as a-day-ahead market. 
– The EEX Spot Market offers two different trading platforms, i.e., the closed 
auction trading for hourly contracts and bloc contracts and the continuous trad-
ing in connection with open Opening and Closing auction for Base as well as 
Peak Load contracts. Both trading schemes will be discussed in greater detail 
in the following sections. 
– If there are no capacity constraints, there will be only one price for Germany in 
the hourly auction – the unconstrained Market Clearing Price (MCP). The price 
mechanism can also be used to relieve constraints in the main transmission 
grid. Therefore, the whole market is divided into bid areas. A bid area is either 
the area of one Transmission System Operator (TSO) or consists of two (or 
more) connected TSO –areas, where the TSO’s involved have agreed to co-
operate in case of activities at the interface towards EEX. There are currently 
four bid areas in Germany. Purchase and sale bids have to be placed separately 
for each bid area. Bid areas may form separate price areas in the case of con-
straints. 
– EEX is the counterpart for Spot transactions and will also exercise the financial 
settlement of the transactions. 
– Resident and foreign participants are admitted to the trade at the EEX Spot 
Market. If a participant wishes to import power from abroad to Germany or to 
export power from Germany, he will have to obtain the right to use the trans-
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mission capacity on the International interconnection point. Furthermore, trad-
ing participants have to conclude a balance agreement with the balance respon-
sible of the relevant bid areas. 
 
Hourly power contracts with constant performance from 0,1 MW in an hour in 0.1 
MW-steps are traded on the EEX Spot Market for delivery on the following day. It 
is also possible to trade blocs, which means a number of connected hours. It is dis-
tinguished between bloc contracts in the hourly auction and Base as well as Peak 
Load contracts from continuous trading. Contrary to the bloc contracts of the 
hourly auction, the smallest trading unit of Base as well as Peak Load contracts in 
continuous trading is 1 MW in each hour of the respective period (Base or Peak 
Load period) for the following day. On trading days, contracts can be concluded 
for all of the 365 days of a year. Trading days are the weekdays Monday to Friday, 
excluding statutory public holidays. 
Closed Auction 
The EEX Spot Market makes use of the bilateral auction bidding for price determi-
nation in connection with a closed Order Book. Auction bidding is characterised by 
the collection of all bids in order to use them for price determination at a certain 
point of time. Since supply as well as demand contributes to the price determina-
tion, it is called bilateral auction bidding. The bids submitted by a market partici-
pant are not revealed to the other market participants, so the possibility of market 
or price manipulations is hereby eliminated. This procedure is referred to as a 
closed auction. 
 
Based on his trading strategies, the trading participant plans how to handle the pro-
duction and the contractual rights and commitments for the next 24 hours. Consid-
ering his trading strategy, the trading participant may decide between hourly bids 
and bloc contracts. The hourly bids can be divided into price dependent, price in-
dependent and flexible bids: 
 
– Price dependent bids can be placed by giving the volumes (per hour) with sin-
gle, selectable prices within the valid price scale with up to 198 price intervals.  
– With price independent bids, hedged volumes are obtained. The trading par-
ticipant will always obtain the volumes at the market price. Giving the same 
value for the upper and lower price limit places a price independent bid. 
– Flexible hourly bids are asking bids, which are executably related to the price 
limit in the hour that is the most expensive hour before the integration of the 
bid. The bid will be executed in the hour with the highest price provided that 
the price limit criteria is met. The most expensive hour is the hour, which, after 
the price calculation – and before the integration of the flexible hourly bid in 
the price calculation – shows the highest price on the basis of all hourly and 
block prices. 
 
The offered EEX bloc contracts in the closed auction are summarised in Table 1. 
The number of bloc contracts as well as the maximum volume per bloc bid is pub-
lished by EEX. The maximum volume per bloc bid is 250 MW. The number of 
permitted bloc bids per participant is limited to six blocs. The bloc bids are inte-
grated in the hourly auction by transforming bloc contracts into price independent 
bids for the hours concerned.  
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Table 1: Definition of EEX bloc contracts in the closed auction. 
No. Block description Delivery times 
01 EEX Night Hour 01 to Hour 06 (00.00 am - 06.00 am) 
02 EEX Morning Hour 07 to Hour 10 (06.00 am - 10.00 am) 
03 EEX High-Noon Hour 11 to Hour 14 (10.00 am - 02.00 pm) 
04 EEX Afternoon Hour 15 to Hour 18 (02.00 pm - 06.00 pm) 
05 EEX Evening Hour 19 to Hour 24 (06.00 pm - 00.00 pm) 
06 Rush-Hour Hour 17 to Hour 20 (04.00 pm - 08.00 pm) 
07 Baseload  Hour 01 to Hour 24 (00.00 am - 24.00 pm) 
08 Peakload Hour 09 to Hour 20 (08.00 am - 08.00 pm) 
09 Off Peak 1 Hour 01 to Hour 08 (00.00 am - 08.00 am) 
10 Off Peak 2 Hour 21 to Hour 24 (08.00 pm - 08.00 pm) 
 
The price calculation during the closed auction follows three steps. In case of a suf-
ficient capacity of the transmission system, the results of step 1 and 3 are identical. 
The bids for purchase and sale are collected up to 12 noon on a trading day. At 12 
noon, the prices and volumes for the following day are calculated. Before calculat-
ing the prices, all bloc contracts are transformed into price independent bids after 
which, the price-volume-combinations for every hour of the day of delivery are 
transformed into a sale and purchase curve by linear interpolation (two neighbour-
ing price-volume-combinations are interpolated at a time). As a result of this, a 
volume can be assigned to each price and vice versa. 
 
The first step is the aggregation of the resulting participant dependent supply and 
demand curves to a single supply curve and a single demand curve for all Ger-
many. The intersection between the two curves represents the balance between 
purchase and sale bids and determines the market-clearing price (MCP). 
 
The following two steps are needed for the determination of the net contractual 
flow between the TSO areas.  
 
In the second calculation step, the individual supply and demand curves are only 
aggregated per bid area (corresponds usually to a TSO area). The intersection of 
the area-related supply and demand curves represents the market-clearing price for 
every bid area. 
 
Thirdly, the price differences of the bid areas are reduced by varying the volumes 
in such a way that price independent demands are introduced to bid areas where the 
area price is lower than the market-clearing price. Price independent offers are in-
troduced to bid areas where the area price is higher than the market clearing price. 
Thus, a (contractual) power flow is created between the bid areas in which the in-
troduced offers and demands sum up to zero. The levelling out of prices begins in 
areas where the area prices show the highest positive and negative deviation. The 
same procedure is applied to the remaining areas.  
 
As long as the calculated (contractual) power flow is lower than the transmission 
capacity allocated to EEX by the TSO’s, or as long as the TSO’s had not informed 
EEX on any transmission constraints, the area’s prices will be completely levelled 
out and the market-clearing price is thereby effective in all areas. The volumes de-
termined in the course of price calculation are rounded down or up and given one 
decimal place; the rounded prices are given two decimal places.  
 
The closed auction trading process is briefly summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Brief description of the closed auction trading process. 
Time Measures 
Day before transac-
tion at 2.30 p.m. 
The Transmission system operators inform about capaci-
ties or possible constraints between the bid areas on their 
web pages. 
Trading day until 
noon 
Bids to be fulfilled on the following day have to be elec-
tronically transferred to EEX. 
Noon to 12.30 p.m. EEX starts the price calculation. The market data is pub-
lished on the Internet until 12.30 p.m., and all market par-
ticipants are informed about traded volumes and prices. 
Following 30 min-
utes 
Complaints can be lodged up. 
From 1.00 p.m. Benchmark data concerning invoices and credits are 
transmitted to the participants. The TSO’s receive the 
schedules for their areas. 
2.30 p.m. Trading procedure is finished. 
Continuous Trading 
The daily trading procedure is divided into the sections Pre-trading, Main trading 
and Post trading. The beginning, end and the duration of each section are deter-
mined by the EEX.  
 
The Pre-Trading Phase starts at 7.30 a.m. (CET). Exchange participants can input, 
annul or change bids and request orders. No transactions are matched. The Order 
Book of the whole market is invisible to the market participants. If available, the 
last determined contract price on the previous day in the same category is indi-
cated.  
 
The Main Trading Phase is sub-divided into Opening auction, Continuous trading 
and Closing auction. It lasts from 8.00 a.m. to approx. noon (CET). 
 
– Before the beginning of the Continuous trading, an Opening Auction takes 
place, consisting of Opening call, price determination and Order Book balanc-
ing phase. It starts at 8.00 a.m. (CET) and lasts until approx. 8.01 a.m. (CET). 
Basically, all Orders already entered participate in this auction, unless their 
execution has been restricted to the Closing auction.  
– Continuous Trading is initiated following the Opening auction at 8.01 a.m. 
(CET) and finishes at 11.55 a.m. (CET). During Continuous trading, the Order 
Book is open, thus displaying the limits, the accumulated order quantities and 
the number of orders in the Order Book at each limit. Each incoming order is 
immediately checked to see if it is executable against orders on the other side 
of the Order Book. 
– The Closing Auction is initiated at the end of Continuous trading. It also com-
prises a call phase, price determination and Order Book balancing phase. The 
Order Book is partially closed during the closing auction. It starts at 11.55 a.m. 
(CET) and lasts until 12.00 noon (CET). All remaining orders in the Order 
Book participate automatically in the Closing auction. Any outstanding orders 
are deleted at the end of the day. 
 
The trades executed can be processed during the Post Trading Phase. It begins 
with the end of the Closing auction and finishes at 5.00 p.m. (CET). The contracts 
available for continuous trading at EEX are summarised in Table 3. For all con-
tracts, the smallest tradable unit is 1 MW for each delivery hour. Regarding the 
contract volume, this means for the Base Load Contract 24 MWh, for the Peak 
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Load contract 12 MWh and for the Weekend Base Load 48 MWh (resp. 47 MWh 
on the day of switching from Winter-time to daylight saving time and 49 MWh on 
the day of switching back from daylight saving time to Winter-time). 
Table 3: Definition of EEX contracts in continuous trading. 
No. Contract Description Delivery Times 
01 Base Load  Hour 01 - hour 24 (00.00 a.m. - 00.00 p.m.) 
for all weekdays 
02 Peak Load Hour 09 - hour 20 (08.00 a.m. - 08.00 p.m.) 
for the weekdays Monday to Friday 
03 Weekend Base Load Hour 01 - hour 24 (00.00 a.m. - 00.00 p.m.) 
combined for Saturday and Sunday 
 
Prices are determined during Continuous trading and at the end of the Opening and 
Closing auction. The price determination takes place automatically. In the Order 
Book, all orders are primarily sorted according to price and after that according to 
time of receipt.  
 
The auction price is determined on the basis of the Order Book situation at the end 
of the call phase. The auction price is the price with the highest executable order 
volume and the lowest surplus across all limits in the Order Book (principle of 
most executable volume).  
 
The price in continuous trading is determined by immediately checking each in-
coming order to see if it is executable against orders on the other side of the Order 
Book. Execution is subject to price/time priority. Orders can be executed in full, in 
part or not at all, so that none, one or several business transactions are generated. 
Market Orders, which have not been executed in the Order Book must be executed 
immediately with the next transaction (if possible).  
Analysis of Prices and Volume 
As in most worldwide electricity markets, German spot market prices for electricity 
are characterised by (cf. also Johnson, Barz 1999): 
 
• Daily, weekly and seasonal cycles; 
• High volatility; 
• Mean reversion and 
• Spikes. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 14, thereby showing daily price averages for peak and 
base products in the day-ahead market, the hourly prices even exhibit higher vola-
tility and spikes. Several analyses have highlighted that among all traded commodi-
ties, electricity exhibits the highest volatilities (e.g., Pilipovic 1998). A major rea-
son for these strong fluctuations is the non-storability of electricity. It implies that 
at each moment in time, supply has to match demand and in peak demand hours, 
prices may increase drastically, especially if some unforeseen plant outages lead to 
capacity shortages. It is worth mentioning that in the hydro-dominated Nordic 
power market, electricity prices exhibit much less short-term fluctuations. The con-
sequence of the storability of water is that electricity prices behave much more like 
those of a storable commodity, even if electricity itself remains non-storable. 
 
The daily trading volume at EEX closed auction is given in Figure 15. This has 
increased considerably over time. 
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Figure 14: Daily averaged hourly spot market price at EEX closed auction in 
(€/MWh). 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Ju
n.
 0
0
A
ug
. 0
0
O
kt
. 0
0
D
ez
. 0
0
Fe
b.
 0
1
A
pr
. 0
1
Ju
n.
 0
1
A
ug
. 0
1
O
kt
. 0
1
D
ez
. 0
1
Fe
b.
 0
2
A
pr
. 0
2
Ju
n.
 0
2
A
ug
. 0
2
O
kt
. 0
2
D
ez
. 0
2
Fe
b.
 0
3
A
pr
. 0
3
Ju
n.
 0
3
A
ug
. 0
3
O
kt
. 0
3
 
 
Figure 15: Daily averaged hourly spot market volume at EEX closed auction in 
(MWh). 
3.3 The German Forward and Futures Markets 
Economic trading always has associated risks. This applies especially to the elec-
tricity business, where the economical success of a company strongly depends on 
the market price for electricity. The EEX futures market supports the market par-
ticipants in managing the market price, counterparts, volume, basic and liquidity 
risk. Hence, a futures market may support the risk management that is based on the 
economic necessity and is required by law. 
 
Futures are standardised forward transactions, traded on an exchange. Volume, 
place of delivery, delivery time, quality, financial and physical administration are 
all standardised, respectively. Both buyer and seller agree on the current date to 
respectively call-off to supply a certain quantity of electricity (according to the 
contract specifications) at a time in the future (delivery period) for a certain price, 
or to effect respective payments.  
 
Maximum tradable delivery periods are the next six months, the current delivery 
month, the next seven quarters and the next three years. The contracts are divided 
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not just into delivery periods, but also in load types; Base Load and Peak Load. 
Base Load includes the delivery days from Monday to Sunday for all 24 hours of 
the day. Peak Load includes the days from Monday to Friday, including national 
holidays, but only between the hours of 8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. (CET). Finally, the 
contract volume denotes a delivery rate of electricity per hour, which underlies the 
settlement payment. The delivery rate per contract is 1 MW during each delivery 
hour of the delivery period. This results, for example, in a contract volume for the 
Base Load Monthly Futures for September of: 24 h per day times 30 days times 1 
MW equals 720 MWh. 
 
Monthly Futures are fulfilled by cash settlement. No physical delivery takes place 
during the delivery period, but buyer and seller of the Futures receive payments, or 
have to effect payments until the end of the delivery period, respectively, until 
closing of the position. The settlement price for Month Futures on the last trading 
day is called Final Settlement Price. The Final Settlement Price is the daily 
weighted average (arithmetical monthly mean) of Base respectively Peak Contract 
for the delivery month. Those reflect the average of the prices of all 24 single hours 
on the EEX auction market. Thus, the final settlement price is the price at which 
the power supply was realised for the respective month and load type on the EEX 
auction market. 
 
Cascading fulfills quarterly and yearly contracts. Cascading means the automatic 
splitting of long-term contracts into contracts with the next shortest period of valid-
ity on the last trading day.  
 
Besides cash settlement and cascading, each trading participant has the opportunity 
of closing or netting his position by the opening of a contrary position until the end 
of the delivery period and the cascading (see above). Closing for Month Futures is 
also possible during delivery period. 
 
The daily trading procedure is quite similar to the continuous action described 
above and is hence divided into the sections Pre-trading, Main trade and Post trad-
ing. The exchange management automatically, or manually, carries out the transi-
tion from one trading section to the next. During these trading phases, each con-
tract traded passes through this daily procedure at least once per day. The trading 
takes place during the exchange trading days. Exchange trading days are all work-
ing days with the exception of official holidays listed in the Public holiday calen-
dar, and weekends.  
 
The Pre-Trading Phase starts approx. 8.30 a.m. and lasts until 8.55 a.m. Trading 
participants can input, annul or change bid and ask orders. No transactions are 
matched and no price information is announced at this time, i.e., the market is 
closed. 
The Main Trading Phase is sub-divided into Opening phase and Continuous trad-
ing. It lasts until 4.00 p.m. for all contracts, respectively, until 12.00 noon for 
monthly contracts on their last trading day.  
 
– During the Opening Phase, the participants may amend their order book. In 
contrast to Pre-trading, an indicative market price is permanently on view to 
lend an indication on the market. This is the price resulting as auction price if 
the price setting would have finished at this time. If no indicative market price 
can be established, the price of the highest limited asked and the price of the 
lowest limited bid contract is shown.  
– During Continuous Trading, the Order Book is open, each market participant 
can see the orders currently in the system, but not which participant is in-
volved. The participants can enter new orders or react to existing orders in the 
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Order Book. Every new order is checked immediately for its feasibility. Order 
execution is undertaken according to the criteria of prices and order receipts, 
i.e., the first orders to be undertaken are those in which price terms are execu-
table. Orders, which cannot be executed immediately, are transferred to the 
Order Book in the order of their validity. 
 
The Post Trading Phase lasts at least one hour. During this phase, trading partici-
pants can use the EEX system in order to enter or access data. Participants can en-
ter, amend and delete own orders, respectively. New entered orders will be consid-
ered in the succeeding day’s trade. Furthermore, closed transactions can be proc-
essed.  
 
Prices are set at the end of the Opening phase and during Continuous trading. The 
price determination is done by the system. All orders are categorised in the Order 
Book, firstly, according to price and, secondly, according to the time at which they 
were entered.  
 
In order to determine the opening price, all orders are sorted in ascending order 
according to price. Generally, the opening price is the price from all valid orders at 
which the highest possible volume with minimum carry-over can be carried out 
(principally of most executable volume). If more than one price limit displays the 
highest executable volume and lowest surplus, then the surpluses are used as a cri-
terion. If the surplus for all limits is on the buy side (surplus of demand), the auc-
tion price is determined according to the highest price limit. If the surplus for all 
limits is on the sell side (surplus of supply), the auction price is stipulated accord-
ing to the lowest price limit. If equal surpluses are on both sell and buy sides, the 
price limit closest to the reference price is chosen.  
 
During Continuous trading, a new price is reached when opposing orders can be 
carried out. If an incoming order enters an Order Book with orders on the opposite 
side of the Order Book, the incoming order is executed according to the price/time 
priority at the reference price or the limit of the executable order of the opposite 
site. The more favourable of these two prices determines the execution of the in-
coming order. This price is announced as the last price. In case the price cannot be 
determined immediately after an order has been entered, the relevant orders are 
saved in the Order Book according to their validity and are announced. 
 
For carrying out all clearing procedures, especially for the calculation of the mar-
gin to be deposited by each participant, a settlement price for each individual con-
tract is determined for each trading day on the EEX Futures Market. The determi-
nation of the settlement price is carried out at the end of Main trading phase of the 
contract on all trading days. The settlement price is the last traded exchange price 
of the contract for the respective trading day when the settlement price does not 
correspond to the actual market situation. The management of the EEX may deter-
mine the settlement price using the ”Chief Trader Procedure“. Three qualified trad-
ers are thereby selected from all participants and they may be asked to name a fair 
value for the contract in question. The mathematical average of these three prices is 
determined to be the settlement price for the contract in question. 
 
Besides the trading of Futures at the EEX, OTC-trading also occurs for forwards in 
Germany. Contrary to futures, forwards are usually settled physically. The trading 
is done there almost continuously during normal business hours. 
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Analysis of Prices and Volume 
Although considerable differences exist between the various products, one ob-
serves that, in general, future and forward prices for electricity in Germany contrar-
ily to spot prices exhibit: 
 
• No cycles; 
• Lower volatility; 
• Little mean reversion. 
 
Figure 16 illustrates this for some selected forward quotes. The absence of cycles 
is, of course, due to the fact that the price developments of forwards for one given 
expiry date are considered here. The forward curve, which includes forward prices 
for different monthly or quarterly delivery dates at a given moment in time, shows 
on the contrary seasonal patterns. The lower volatility of the forward prices is re-
lated to the fact that the forwards itself are storable equities, since they may be pur-
chased today and sold tomorrow, or next month. This also explains why little 
mean-reversion in these prices is observed. As for any storable equity, arbitrage 
opportunities would arise if the (discounted and risk-adjusted) product price does 
not follow a martingale process, i.e., a stochastic process where the observed value 
for today corresponds to the risk adjusted expected value for tomorrow (cf., e.g., 
Hull 2000). 
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Figure 16: Electricity forward prices in (€/MWh). Source: broker quotes of various 
sources. 
According to many analysts, the volume of OTC-trading in Germany is much 
higher than the EEX Futures trading. However, no precise figures can be given. 
3.4 The German Regulating Power Markets  
It is a well-known fact that electricity cannot be stored in any major quantities. 
This is why the amounts of electricity generated and consumed have to match ex-
actly. Only this balance can ensure the reliable operation of the electricity system. 
In principle, this load-frequency control follows the regulations set by the UCTE. 
To maintain the balance of generation and consumption, the generation of power 
units that are connected to the UCTE network needs to be controlled and moni-
tored. The generation control, the technical reserves and the corresponding per-
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formance measurements are essential to allow TSO’s to perform daily operational 
business. Control actions are performed in different successive steps, each with 
different characteristics and qualities, and all depending on each other: 
 
– Primary control starts within seconds as a joint action; 
– Secondary control replaces primary control after minutes by the responsible 
partner; 
– Tertiary control frees secondary control by re-scheduling generation by the 
responsible partner. 
 
Hence, a distinction is made between primary balancing power (primary control), 
secondary balancing power (secondary control) and minute reserve (tertiary con-
trol). They differ in terms of the activation and response speed. Primary and secon-
dary balancing power are automatically called up by the TSO from controllable 
power plants. Primary balancing power must be fully provided within 30 seconds, 
while secondary balancing power has to be available within 5 minutes, as required. 
Requests of the TSO for minute reserve are communicated by telephone to the re-
spective supplier. When secondary balancing power is required for longer periods 
of time, minute reserve is especially used after power plant losses to replace secon-
dary balancing power and release it to meet new balancing needs. Minute reserve is 
always used as schedule delivery based on full quarters of an hour and must, there-
fore, be capable of being completely activated within 15 minutes. All these control 
qualities are traded in Germany in open regulating power markets (RPM). The con-
trol qualities are described in greater detail in a glossary at the end of this chapter. 
General Structure of the RPM in Germany 
Due to different reasons, the TSO’s in Germany, RWE Net AG, E.ON Netz GmbH, 
EnBW Transportnetze AG and Vattenfall Europe Transmission GmbH, established 
their own mainly Internet-based RPM to procure the various types of balancing 
power by way of competitive tendering in the deregulated power market. The mar-
kets were gradually established in February 2001 (RWE), December 2001 (E.ON), 
August 2002 (EnBW) and September 2002 (VE). While tendering for primary and 
secondary balancing, power reserve takes place every six months. Tendering for 
minute reserve is carried out every day. The used tendering model is schematised 
in Figure 17. The main characteristics of the RPM for primary, secondary and min-
ute reserve are summarised in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.  
 
Selection of bidders
Use of tendered reserves
SettlementTendering
BiddingSceleton contracts
Pre-qualification
 
 
Figure 17: Schematised tendering model of the RPM in Germany. 
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Table 4: Main characteristics of the RPM for primary reserve in Germany (Dated 
10.2003). 
RWE Net AG E.ON Netz GmbH EnBW Transportnetze AG
Vattenfall Europe 
Transmission GmbH
Trading time biannual               (Feb-Jul & Aug-Jan)
biannual                
(Jun-Nov & Dez-Mai)
biannual               
(Feb-Jul & Aug-Jan)
biannual                
(Mar-Aug & Sep-Feb)
Total capacity asked +310 MW / -310 MW +190 MW / -190 MW + 75 MW / - 75 MW +150 MW / -150 MW 
Min. capacity to offer +- 2 MW +- 10 MW +- 10 MW +- 10 MW
L, PLP L, PLP L, PLP L, PLP
only working day / 
weekend possible Peak-/Base-Periods 
1 )
only working day / 
weekend possible
only working day / 
weekend possible
Time to guarantee reserves At least 6 hrs. Whole offer period At least 6 hrs. At least 4 hrs. 
1 )
Peak-Periods: Mo-Fr: 6 am 
to 10 pm, Sa, So: 8 am to 
1 pm; Base-Periods: else
Offer characteristics
Table 5: Main characteristics of the RPM for secondary reserve in Germany 
(Dated 10.2003). 
RWE Net AG E.ON Netz GmbH EnBW Transportnetze AG
Vattenfall Europe 
Transmission GmbH
Trading time biannual               (Feb-Jul & Aug-Jan)
biannual                
(Jun-Nov & Dez-Mai)
biannual                
(Feb-Jul & Aug-Jan)
biannual                
(Mar-Aug & Sep-Feb)
Total capacity asked +1230 MW / -1230 MW +800 MW / -400 MW + 720 MW / - 390 MW + 580 MW / - 580 MW
Min. capacity to offer +- 30 MW +- 30 MW +- 30 MW +- 20 MW
L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP
Peak-/Base-Periods 2 ) Peak-/Base-Periods 1 ) Peak-/Base-Periods 3 ) Peak-/Base-Periods 3 )
Time to guarantee reserves At least 4 hrs. Whole offer period At least 4 hrs. At least 4 hrs. 
1 ) 2 ) 3 )
Peak-Periods: Mo-Fr: 6 am 
to 10 pm, Sa, So: 8 am to 
1 pm; Base-Periods: else
Peak-Periods: 8 am to 
8pm; Base-Periods: else
Peak-Periods: Mo-Fr: 8 am 
to 8pm; Base-Periods: else
Offer characteristics
Table 6: Main characteristics of the RPM for minute reserve in Germany (Dated 
10.2003). 
RWE Net AG E.ON Netz GmbH EnBW Transportnetze AG
Vattenfall Europe 
Transmission GmbH
Trading time daily daily daily daily
Total capacity asked +1030 MW / -760 MW +1100 MW / -400 MW + 510 MW / - 330 MW + 730 MW / - 530 MW
Min. capacity to offer +- 30 MW +- 50 MW +- 30 MW +- 30 MW
L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP L, PAP, PLP
5 offer periods 1 ) Peak-/Base-Periods 2 ) Peak-/Base-Periods 3 ) 6 offer periods 1 )
Time to guarantee reserves At least 4 hrs. Whole offer period Whole offer period Whole offer period
Selection of bidders PLP PLP PLP PLP and PAP (Optimization)
Remuneration Pay-as-bid Uniform pricing Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid
Market open until Day-ahead, 2 pm 4 ) Day-ahead, 10.30 am 4 ) Day-ahead, 1.30 pm 4 ) Day-ahead, 9 am 4 )
Decision of selection Day-ahead, 6 pm 4 ) Day-ahead, 11.30 am 4 ) Day-ahead, 2.30 pm 4 ) Day-ahead, 10 am 4 )
1 ) 2 ) 3 ) 4 )
0 am to 4 am, 4 am to 8 
am, 8 am to 4 pm (RWE), 
8 am to 12 am and 12 am 
to 4pm (VE), 4 pm to 8 
pm, 8 pm to 12 pm
Peak-Periods: Mo-Fr: 6 am 
to 10 pm, Sa, So: 8 am to 
1 pm; Base-Periods: else
Peak-Periods: Mo-Fr: 8 am 
to 8pm; Base-Periods: else
Trades only on weekdays
Offer characteristics
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Pre-Qualification 
Potential suppliers of the various types of balancing power can participate in a pre-
qualification procedure by which the technical capabilities of the generation units 
or customer-based facilities to be used for the supply of balancing power are re-
viewed by the TSO. Following successful pre-qualification, the supplier is entitled 
to participate in the tendering procedures.  
 
Skeleton Contracts 
The commercial and administrative outline conditions are defined in master agree-
ments before the first bid can be submitted.  
 
Tendering 
Tendering for minute reserve is Internet-based. All the communication with the 
respective bidders, such as submission of bids and information about the award 
decision, takes place in a secure portal. General market information, including an 
anonymous presentation of the bids and award decision, is available in a public 
area. The market processes, such as tendering, deadlines, award processes, are 
largely automatic. Tendering for primary and secondary balancing power is not 
conducted across the Internet, but in a conventional manner mainly because these 
contracts are awarded over longer periods of time. 
 
The RPM in Germany are designed to be one-sided, multi-unit and multi-part pro-
curement auctions. They are one-sided as a market participant can either offer or 
ask for reserves (in contrast to the double auction design of the spot market). Multi-
unit refers to the fact that more than one reserve unit is auctioned at the same time. 
Multi-part reflects the important fact that each offer for secondary and minute re-
serve is based on two-price information, the capacity and the energy price. Primary 
reserve is traded based on energy price offers only. The capacity price is paid for 
holding the selected capacity in reserve (it is not allowed to use this capacity for 
any other purpose) and the energy price is paid only if the reserved capacity is ac-
tually used. Each reserve capacity is procured in positive and negative direction. 
Positive reserve is required to balance a shortfall of required capacity and negative 
to balance a surplus. The tendering described so far is similar at each RPM. How-
ever, the rest of the tendering process is quite different, cf. Table 4, Table 5 and 
Table 6. Some of these differences are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Bidding 
When bidding, a market participant will determine his offers with respect to profit 
maximising. As there are four markets, the bidder needs to determine the offer 
prices and capacities for each market separately. For this, several aspects need to 
be considered, mainly (1) minimum capacity to offer, (2) different offer periods, 
(3) time to guarantee the reserves and (4) different times of market opening and 
closing. 
 
Selection of Bidders 
The bids are examined on the basis of commercial and technical criteria. It is es-
sential that sufficient balancing power is available at all times for contracts to be 
awarded during the award period and that system security is ensured. Currently, 
only daily averaged capacity prices and the minimal and maximal energy prices are 
published separately for positive and negative reserves by the TSO. Hence, no 
hourly or segment-specified prices as well as no volume is available. However, the 
market participants have information based on their own offers so that they might 
be able to reason the possible range of market prices. 
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Use of tendered reserves 
The tendered reserves are used with increasing energy price (merit order) to main-
tain the balance of generation and consumption. 
 
Settlement and Remuneration 
As described earlier, offers are based on a capacity price for holding the procured 
capacity in reserve (secondary and minute reserve) and an energy price for the ac-
tual use of the procured capacity (all reserve qualities). In principle, two possibili-
ties exist to remunerate the suppliers. Firstly, by using the pay-as-bid method, bid-
ders receive their individual bid prices. Secondly, by using the uniform-price 
method, bidders receive a uniform price based on the highest accepted bid. 
 
The settlement may be differentiated between power and energy related costs. The 
power related costs are socialised among all system users via usage fees. The en-
ergy related costs are individualised among balance responsible entities (net devia-
tions from planned programmes of balance groups are valuated).  
Analysis of Prices and Volume 
The daily averaged RPM capacity and minimal and maximal RPM energy prices 
for positive minute reserve are given in Figure 18 and Figure 19, respectively. It 
may been seen that the prices are similar to the spot market ones that are character-
ised by: 
 
• Daily and weekly cycles; 
• High volatility;  
• Spikes. 
 
The volatility and spikes of the capacity and energy prices increased considerably, 
especially within the last few months. This was mainly due to the unforeseen 
weather characteristics with high temperatures, few water in-flow to the pump stor-
age plants and low wind power production. This lead to high volatility price spikes 
at the spot market and hence at the RPM. It is worth noting that the volatility at the 
E.ON market is lower compared to the RWE or EnBW RPM. This is mainly due to 
the different closing hours of the market, where the offers are only placed at the 
E.ON RPM without information concerning the spot market price of the same day. 
Generally, the RPM for positive minute reserve does not show mean reversion as 
known from most spot markets. On the contrary, a tendency to remain on a reached 
price level may be observed (especially in 2001 and 2002). This tendency supports 
the possibility of having an imperfect market. 
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Figure 18: Daily averaged hourly RPM prices for positive minute reserve in 
(€/MW). 
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Figure 19: Minimal and maximal RPM energy prices for positive minute reserve in 
(€ct/kWh). 
The overall accepted bidders averaged RPM capacity prices for primary reserve are 
given with Figure 20. Compared to minute reserve, the prices are considerably 
higher. This may partly be explained with the oligopolistic structure of the market 
for primary reserve and on the fact that much higher technical requirements need to 
be fulfilled by the power plants to be allowed to deliver primary reserve. It may be 
seen that there are (again) relatively high deviations between the markets with a 
tendency to higher convergence within the last months.  
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Figure 20: Averaged RPM capacity prices for primary reserve in (€/kW). 
 
The overall accepted bidders, averaged RPM capacity prices and minimal energy 
prices for positive secondary reserve are given in Figure 21 and Figure 22, respec-
tively. The capacity prices are lower compared to primary and higher compared to 
minute reserve, due to lower technical requirements compared to primary reserve 
and higher ones compared to minute reserve. The observed differences between the 
markets are not as great as in primary RPM, which may lead to the suggestion that 
the secondary RPM is based on higher competition with higher trading volume 
(however, this suggestion cannot be approved as no information on the offered 
volumes are published). The energy prices are extremely low compared to the en-
ergy prices for minute reserve, and even though the maximal values are not given 
in the figure, it may be noted that they do not deviate as much from the given 
minimal ones as in the minute RPM. This may be explained with the higher portion 
of power plants with relatively high variable costs (e.g., open cycle gas turbine, 
OCGT) offered in the minute reserve rather than in the secondary reserve markets. 
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Figure 21: Averaged RPM capacity prices for positive secondary reserve (€/kW). 
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Figure 22: Minimal RPM energy prices for positive secondary reserve in 
(€ct/kWh). 
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4 Models 
A qualitative description of the power market models used in Wilmar is given in 
this chapter, although the mathematical presentations of the models have been 
omitted and will be treated in a later publication from the project.  
 
The intention of the section is not to give a full documentation of the Planning 
model, but to describe the ideas and assumptions behind the representation of the 
power markets to be included in the modelling tool. Full documentation of the 
Planning model will be given in Deliverable D6.2 to be published at a later stage of 
the project. In the following therefore first an overview of different approaches to 
modelling power markets and electricity prices is given in section 4.1, then the 
general approach chosen in the WILMAR project is discussed in section 4.2 and 
4.3. The main model components, being the long-term model and the joint market 
model, are discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. 
4.1 Modelling Power Markets and Electricity Prices 
In the past, various approaches have been developed to analyse and predict power 
markets and resulting electricity prices. They may be broadly divided into at least 
five classes (cf. Table 7). Among the theoretically founded models, fundamental 
models are allowed to account well for the impact of power plant characteristics 
and capacities, for restrictions in transmission capacities and demand variations. 
The financial mathematical models are more suited for coping with the volatility of 
electricity prices and are often used for option valuation and risk assessment pur-
poses. A third category of models is formed by game-theoretic approaches, which 
are particularly adequate for analysing the impact of strategic behaviour on elec-
tricity prices.  
Besides these models with strong theoretical foundations, other more empirically 
motivated models are found: The fourth class of models, statistical and economet-
ric time-series models, relate the fluctuations of electricity prices to the impact of 
external factors such as temperature, time of the day, luminosity, etc. The stochas-
tic aspect of electricity price formation is acknowledged here albeit often not dealt 
with in much detail. In fact, this type of model is very complimentary to finance 
models, in that the statistical and econometric models deal in detail with possible 
explanatory variables for electricity price fluctuations whereas the finance models 
focus on the stochastic part of the price change. All the above-mentioned models 
will all be treated in more details in the following sections of this paper. 
 
Finally, so-called “technical” analysis and expert systems can also be mentioned as 
methods used especially by practitioners to anticipate price movements on power 
markets based on the analysis of past price developments. This category of model-
ling will not be treated in this paper. Instead, Section 4.4 sketches a novel inte-
grated model combining the two aforementioned approaches of fundamental and 
financial models. 
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Table 7: Types of power market models 
Model Category Examples 
Theoretically Founded Models  
Fundamental models Kreuzberg (1999), Starrmann 
(2000), Müsgen, Kreuzberg 
(2001), Ravn et al. (2001), Kramer 
(2002) 
Finance models Pilipovic (1998), Schwartz (1997), 
Johnson, Barz (1999), Barlow 
(2002) 
Game theoretical models Green, Newbery (1992), Bolle 
(1992), Bolle (2001), Jebjerg, 
Riechmann (2001), Weber (2001) 
Empirically Motivated Models  
Statistical models Erdmann, Federico (2001) 
“Technical” analysis and expert systems  
Fundamental Models 
The basic idea of fundamental models is to analyse power markets based on a de-
scription of generation, transmission and demand, combining the technical and 
economical aspects. These models often aim at also explaining electricity prices 
from the marginal generation costs. Examples of such models include Kreuzberg 
(1999), Starrmann (2000), Müsgen, Kreuzberg (2001), Ravn et al. (2001), Kramer 
(2002), Kurihara et al (2002) and ILEX (2003). Many more fundamental models 
have been developed by consultants or the utilities themselves and are, therefore, 
not published. Fundamental models are often also incorporated in more sophisti-
cated game theoretic (Jebjerg, Riechmann 2000, Ellersdorfer et al. 2000, Hobbs et 
al. 2002) or stochastic models (Skantze et al. 2000, Barlow 2002). However, in the 
latter papers, continuous approximations to the fundamental electricity price forma-
tion are especially used.  
 
The basic assumption of fundamental models is that the electricity spot market op-
erates efficiently, so that it leads to an efficient system operation with minimal 
costs, satisfying all customer demands. If customer demand is taken as price inelas-
tic (and there is much evidence of almost price-inelastic demand, cf., e.g., the fig-
ure for Alberta given in Barlow 2002), prices will equal to the marginal generation 
costs of the last unit needed to fulfil given demand. This result of price formation 
according to the merit order curve is graphically illustrated in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Merit order and shadow prices in the simple cost minimisation model.  
Of course, this is only a very basic model, which has to be extended into several 
directions in order to at least cope to some extent with the reality in European elec-
tricity markets. A first extension to be considered is multi-regional modelling. 
Since transmission capacities between countries and within countries are often lim-
ited, those have to be included in an optimisation model, which describes the cost 
minimal provision of electricity demand.  
 
Besides the often-focused on thermal power plants, hydro power plants also play a 
considerable role in many electric power systems, including the European one. At 
least three cases here have to be distinguished: Run-of-river plants,  
Hydro storage plants and Hydro storage plants with pumping facilities (pumped 
storage plants). Notably, the storage plants require a modelling approach, which 
encompasses several times steps and possibly stochastic inflows, such as in the 
EMPS model. 
 
Furthermore, start-up costs may considerably influence the unit commitment deci-
sions of plant operators. In unit commitment and load dispatch models, they are 
typically modelled using binary variables for unit operation, start-up and shut 
down. But this is hardly feasible when modelling a national or regional market. 
Weber (2003) has, however, provided an approximate approach for dealing with 
part-load efficiencies and start-up costs. 
 
A further point to be considered is the different types of reserves, which have to be 
provided by the generators. A rather detailed model of the different cases for the 
German market can be found in Kreuzberg (1999).  
 
For the practical implementation of any such fundamental model, three major chal-
lenges arise. The first one is data availability. Depending on the market, more or 
less information on plant capacities and costs, demand patterns and transmission 
capacities may be available to construct such a model. A second challenge is the 
choice of appropriate time resolution. On the one hand, the modelling of seasonal 
hydro storage necessitates the modelling of a full year. On the other hand, the ade-
quate modelling of start-up costs requires a time resolution of one hour, or at most 
two. In order to keep the model manageable, one solution is to model typical days, 
as will be done within the framework of the integrated model (cf. Section 4.4). An-
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other is to use load segments within a seasonally decomposed yearly model (cf. 
Kreuzberg 1999). In this framework, the integration of start-up costs is, however, 
difficult.  
 
A final challenge is the incorporation of stochastic fluctuations, e.g., in demand or 
plant availability. This is particularly relevant, if the model is to be directly used 
for short-term predictions (time horizon of up to two weeks). At longer time hori-
zons, the impact of current values of the stochastic variables on the future prices is 
rather limited, as can be both explained fundamentally (stability of weather condi-
tions, duration of plant outages) and observed empirically (cf. Section 0). Of 
course, it is in principle also possible to model all fundamental stochastic fluctua-
tions fundamentally, by carrying out, e.g., Monte-Carlo-simulations of demand 
variations, plant outages, etc. But even if these processes could be perfectly mod-
elled bottom-up, one should not expect to describe the full range of fluctuations 
observed on the markets: As demonstrated for the financial markets (cf. Hull 
2000), trading itself is expected to contribute to the creation of stochastic fluctua-
tions. 
Finance and Econometric Models 
The field par excellence of the numerous models developed in finance describes 
the stochastics of price movements. Originally developed for stock and interest rate 
markets, quite a number of these models have also subsequently been applied to the 
energy field. Econometric models have also to be dealt with in this paragraph, 
since there is considerable overlap between these two categories. The key emphasis 
of econometric models is on the inclusion and specification of deterministic regres-
sors. Yet, given the specificities of electricity, notably its non-storability, not only 
specific models for the deterministic term have to be considered, but also the sto-
chastics may be more adequately modelled by more advanced models.  
 
At the beginning, price movements on the wholesale markets for electricity and 
other energy carriers have been described using models originally developed for 
modelling the stock and interest rate markets, and even today, the geometric 
Brownian motion is still used frequently to describe electricity market prices on the 
forward and future markets. Another popular model is the so-called mean-reversion 
process, which account for the tendency of electricity prices to return to some aver-
age equilibrium value. Another extension is the jump-diffusion processes, which 
more specifically cope with the price spikes that are observed in many power mar-
kets. 
 
Besides the specification of the stochastic structure, any spot market model for 
electricity has to account for the cyclical, more or less deterministic effects, which 
are observable in spot market prices. Three different types of cyclical effects can be 
distinguished: hour-of-the-day effects, day-of-the-week effects and seasonal ef-
fects. For all three, one of the following approaches could, in principle, be applied: 
 
• Inclusion of continuous variables; 
• Inclusion of corresponding dummy variables; 
• Distinction of separate models. 
 
For example, Pilipovic (1998) uses sinus and cosinus functions to model seasonal 
effects, whereas Cuaresma et al. (2003) include monthly dummies to make the 
equilibrium price p0 in the specifications time-dependent. Lucia and Schwartz 
(2000) test both specifications. Although monthly dummy variables seem at first 
sight to be more accurate, they are problematic when it comes to forecasting be-
yond the limits of one month: a sudden change in the time varying mean (estimated 
44  Risø-R-1441 (EN) 
from the observed data) may induce a sudden price shock, which is amplified 
through the mean-reversion process. 
 
For the hour-by-hour variations, Cuaresma et al. (2003) tests both a specification 
with dummy variables and a distinction of separate models as proposed by Rama-
nathan et al. (1997). They find clear evidence that a distinction of different models 
leads to a higher model quality. 
 
Overall, finance and econometric models are of considerable importance when it 
comes to analysing the characteristics of electricity prices, but they obviously do 
not tell much about the generation technologies used for power production or the 
adequacy of supply and demand. 
Modelling Competition in the Electricity Industry 
Besides price uncertainty, the strategies of the competitors also affect the decisions 
of electric utilities. Models of competitive electricity markets with explicit actor 
modelling have to date been mostly developed to analyse longer-term equilibrium 
on the wholesale market.  
 
In general, two types of approaches have been used to model the competition on 
the wholesale market. The first one is using the Cournot-Nash framework (cf., e. 
g., Andersson / Bergmann, 1995; Borenstein et al., 1999; Ellersdorfer et al., 2001, 
Ellersdorfer et al., 2003 (see also the overview in Smeers, 1997). Underlying are 
the assumptions of electricity as a homogenous good and of market equilibrium 
being determined through the capacity setting decisions of suppliers. This model 
type is, however, only appropriate for the description of the medium to long-term 
equilibrium determination. Namely, the existence of Nash equilibrium in this mod-
elling framework requires substantial negative own price elasticity for electricity. 
While most empirical studies (e.g., Dennerlein 1990, Dahl 1994) agree that signifi-
cant negative own price elasticities exist for electricity in the longer run, both em-
pirical studies and most practitioners agree on the electricity price elasticity to be 
negligible for the short run or even non-existent.  
 
The second one is modelling the price equilibrium on the wholesale market as the 
equilibrium of companies bidding with supply (and possibly demand curves) into 
the wholesale market. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery 
(1992) developed the first models that used this approach. Further models in this 
vein include Bolle (1992), Bolle (2001) and Hobbs (2001). As emphasised by Bolle 
(2001), supply curve bidding will only lead to results different from traditional 
Cournot-Nash equilibria, if demand uncertainty (or another source of uncertainty) 
leads to an ex-ante undetermined equilibrium. Otherwise, the supply (and demand 
curve) bidding collapses to one point, which corresponds to the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Recent work in this field has on the one hand looked in more detail at 
the role of capacity constraints for strategic price equilibria (cf., e.g., von der Fehr, 
Harbord 1997; Baldick, Hogan 2002; Crampes, Creti 2002). On the other hand, 
numerous models have been set up to analyse the interactions between grid restric-
tions and market power for suppliers (e.g., Harvey, Hogan 2000, Hobbs et al. 2000, 
Gilbert et al. 2002, Metzler et al. 2003). Furthermore, recent research has empha-
sised the role of a contract market for future and/or forward contracts for mitigating 
market power in electricity markets (cf., e.g., Newbery 1998, Ellersdorfer 2003). 
 
Three points seem particularly worth retaining from this vast literature: Most of the 
models developed are focusing on qualitative issues, taking quantitative results 
more as illustrative examples than as ultimate research objective. This is linked to 
the second observation that most analyses aim at providing decision support more 
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to the regulators than to the utilities. The third point is that in most analyses, the 
entire focus is on the wholesale market and that the interlinkage between wholesale 
and retail markets are hardly analysed so far.  
An Integrated Modelling Approach 
The previous discussion on fundamental and financial models for electricity market 
modelling has pointed at the relative strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
In particular, the case for pure financial models is weakened by the fact that the 
non-arbitrage argument underlying many financial model developments can hardly 
be applied to electricity prices. Instead, a time series of electricity spot prices has to 
be viewed as a series of consecutive, but only partly linked market equilibria. 
These market equilibria may be computed (approximatively at least) through fun-
damental models – but these have huge difficulties in describing the stochastics 
observed in the electricity market. Therefore, Weber (2003a, 2003b) has proposed 
an integrated model, which combines fundamental and finance type models. More 
precisely, it uses the price established by a fundamental model as equilibrium price 
for a mean-reversion stochastic model.  
 
The overall approach for this integrated model of electricity markets is sketched in 
Figure 24. In a first step, the stochastic development of prices on the primary en-
ergy market is modelled through a finance-type model. The resulting energy prices 
are taken as an input to a fundamental model of the European electricity market. 
This model yields marginal generation costs differentiated by time of the day, type 
of day and month in the year. These prices could be used as an input to a game-
theoretic model yielding the prices and mark-up charged by strategic players in the 
market. However, such a model is not easy to solve in the proposed context. There-
fore, the system marginal costs are directly used as an input for a stochastic model 
of the electricity market.  
 
1. Model for primary energy
Primary energy prices
2. Fundamental model
System marginal costs
utility
strategies
3. Stochastic electricity
market model
Spot & Future prices
& corresp. distributions OTC-
marketExchange
Trader TraderTrader
Utility A Utility CUtility B
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Figure 24: General approach for the integrated electricity market model. 
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4.2 General Modelling Assumptions  
Number of Markets for Physical Delivery of Electricity 
Three electricity markets are included in the Planning model, namely: 
 
1. A day-ahead market for physical delivery of electricity where the Elspot 
market at Nord Pool is taken as the starting point9. This market will in the 
following text be called the day-ahead market.  
2. An intra-day market for handling deviations between production and con-
sumption agreed upon on the day-ahead market and the realised values of 
production and consumption in the actual operation hour. Regulating 
power can be traded up to the start of the actual operation hour. Hourly 
mean-values are used meaning that there is no inter-hour regulation hap-
pening in the model. Both flexible producers and flexible consumers offer 
regulating power on this market, which in the following text is called the 
intra-day market. The demand for regulating power is defined by the 
forecast errors connected to the wind power production.  
3. A day-ahead market for automatically activated reserve power (frequency 
activated or load-flow activated). The demand for these ancillary services 
is determined exogenously to the model. This market will be called the an-
cillary services market. 
 
Descriptions of the day-ahead markets and the intra-day markets functioning at 
Nord Pool and EEX at present are given in Chapters 2 and 3. Over-the-
counter/bilateral trading of physical power contracts will not be included in the 
model, because the power prices of the bilateral contracts will in a perfect market 
reflect the expected prices on the day-ahead market, and the inclusion of OTC trad-
ing will, therefore, have little impact on the model results. 
 
Finally, the day-ahead and intra-day power markets will cover the whole geo-
graphical area, i.e., we assume that the day-ahead market at Nord Pool and EEX 
can be analysed as one market10, and the same applies to the intra-day market. 
Other Markets Represented in the Model 
Three further markets are taken into account that influence and may interact with 
the above markets. These are markets for: 
 
• District-Heating and Process Heat; 
• Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs); 
• CO2 quotas and Tradable CO2 Emission Permits (TEPs). 
 
The markets for district heating and process heat is included in the Planning model, 
because they interact with the day-ahead and intra-day markets due to the existence 
of CHP plants, electrical heat pans and heat pumps. 
 
The TGC market and TEP market influence the functioning of the power system 
through changing marginal cost levels for actors bidding at the day-ahead and in-
                                                     
9 The model must enable changes in the spot market trading rules such as a change from a day-ahead 
market to an hour-ahead market. 
10 Although we assume one market covering the whole geographical area, this does not imply that we 
will only have one market price in the whole area. Exchange restrictions between areas will result 
in different area prices.  
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tra-day markets. The income or costs from TGC’s and TEP’s change the relative 
competitiveness among actors when allocating bids at the power markets. 
 
It remains to be decided on how to represent these markets in the model. The TGC 
market will only influence the day-ahead market bidding of generating plants using 
renewable energy sources, i.e., wind power, photovoltaics, waste power and bio-
mass power. Of these technologies, only biomass power has significant short-term 
marginal generating costs11. The reduction in the day-ahead market bidding price 
due to the existence of a TGC connected to the electricity production will, there-
fore, probably only have a significant influence on biomass power. A market for 
green certificates may be exogenous to the model. 
 
There are two different ways of representing CO2 quotas in the model: 
 
1. Assuming a fixed quota for the North European electricity system and us-
ing a long-term model to optimise the CO2 emissions during a year. The 
result will be an endogenous determination of the CO2 shadow price. 
2. The North European electricity system can be assumed to be a price taker 
on a larger European-wide market for CO2 emission permits. The result 
will be that the CO2 shadow price in the model will be exogenous and 
equal to the price on the large CO2 TEP market. 
 
Both possibilities are easy to implement in the Planning model and will, therefore, 
be available according to the purpose of the model simulations. 
Short-Term Marginal Pricing 
We assume perfect competition where power suppliers offer electricity to the 
short-term marginal cost of generation of the power plants. This assumption 
covers both the day-ahead and the intra-day market. For a given power plant, the 
short-term marginal cost of generation covers the price of the fuel input and the 
variable operation and maintenance costs, including start/stop costs. Investment 
costs and fixed operation and maintenance costs are not included in the short-term 
marginal costs.  
 
Using sale bids based on the short-term marginal cost of generation will in some 
cases result in power pool prices that are significantly below the historical day-
ahead market prices observed on Nord Pool and EEX. To obtain a better corre-
spondence between model results and historical realisations, an add-on to sales bids 
can be included in the model. One method of calculating the size of the sale bid 
adders is to estimate the capacity rent of the power plant in question, i.e., the annu-
alised investment costs and the fixed operation and maintenance costs.  
4.3 Modelling Framework  
Figure 25 shows an overview of the models that either provide input to the  
Planning model or constitute the Planning model. The exchange of forecast data 
and data for the actual operating hour between models is illustrated in the  
figure. A number of models provide input to the Planning model as seen in the fig-
ure. The Planning model consists of two sub models corresponding to optimisation 
over two different time horizons.  
                                                     
11 The present short-term marginal costs of waste power are very low, because the fuel input (the 
waste) has a price of zero or below zero (the plants are paid for burning the waste). 
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Figure 25: Overview of the data input and models that either provides input to the 
planning model or constitutes the planning model.  
 
Due to the existence of hydro reservoirs and limitations on the amount of water 
inflow to the hydropower system, the use of hydropower must be optimised over a 
one-year (or longer) horizon. Furthermore, if we assume the existence in the model 
of a fixed CO2 quota for the North European electricity system, the CO2 emissions 
from the power plants will be subject to a long-term (yearly) restriction.  
 
The Long-Term Model will optimise the use of water inflow and CO2 quotas over a 
one-year horizon. The input from the long-term model to the Joint  
Market model will be one table with the water values (opportunity costs of using 
stored water) as a function of reservoir filling and time of year, and another table 
with the CO2 shadow prices as a function of the fraction of the available CO2 quota 
still not used and the time of year. 
 
The Joint Market Model will optimise the use of heat and power generating tech-
nologies and heat and power storage technologies during a bidding period12 subject 
to a flexible demand. More precisely, the model will optimise the sum of consum-
ers’ and producers’ surplus on both the day-ahead market and the intra-day market 
(so-called joint optimisation) taking the stochastic nature of the demand for regu-
lating power on the intra-day market into account. This means that for generating 
technologies with a flexible power output, the amount of power offered at the day-
                                                     
12 24 hours for the present day-ahead market at Nord Pool with a 12-hour interval between submis-
sion of bids and start of the bidding period. 
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ahead market will not always be the maximal power output available, but they will 
sometimes offer less at the day-ahead market due to an expected revenue from the 
selling of up-regulation at the intra-day market.  
 
Implementing joint optimisation in the Joint Market model means that the amounts 
and marginal costs of regulating power available in a future operating hour as a 
function of the regulation needs in the bidding period will be determined in the 
Joint Market model.  
 
Furthermore, the Joint Market model takes into account that some part of the avail-
able production capacity must be reserved for providing automatically activated 
reserve power. The distribution of the demand for ancillary services on the power 
plants available for providing these services is done endogenously in the model by 
including this ancillary services market in the optimisation of consumers’ and pro-
ducers’ surplus. 
 
The Joint Market model will use water values and CO2 shadow prices obtained 
from the Long-Term model and input from other models to determine the short-
term marginal costs of different supply technologies. Two sets of short-term mar-
ginal costs can be thought of; one set for delivering power sold at the day-ahead 
market, i.e., where the future production is known at least 12 hours before delivery, 
and another set for up or down regulation delivered at the intra-day market, where 
the power output must be changed with one hour notice. Discussions in the project 
team involving ELSAM, the power plant operator, has revealed that these two sets 
of costs can be assumed equal, i.e., the extra costs connected to changing produc-
tion fast are negligible compared to the modelling simplifications and data uncer-
tainties connected to the representation of production costs in the Planning model. 
 
Combined with the heat and power demand curves obtained from the heat demand 
and power demand models, and combined with forecasts of the amount of up or 
down regulation needed in the actual operating hours, the day-ahead market model 
for each operating hour in the bidding period determines production, consumption 
and prices on the day-ahead market. The demand for either up or down-regulation 
in each hour in the bidding period is calculated by comparing the forecasted values 
of wind power production and power demand (and maybe other parameters) with 
the realised values. Having determined the realised state, the results from the Joint 
Market model will determine how the units were actually operated during the day-
ahead market period and the resulting prices on the intra-day market. 
 
The market-crosses at the day-ahead and intra-day markets will determine the dis-
patch of the generating units and this will, in addition, determine the power flows 
in the system (the dispatch being modified in the presence of bottlenecks in the 
transmission grid). Furthermore, the market-crosses are based on a  
marginal cost approach, so the difference between the prices obtained at the day-
ahead and intra-day markets and the marginal costs of a given unit will determine 
the profit of operating the unit in the electricity system. 
4.4 Long-term Model 
The main subject of the Wilmar project is the integration of wind power into the 
electricity system. Hence, the focus is on short-term issues, typically working on an 
hourly basis. 
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However, in order to have a self-contained model, it will also be necessary to treat 
the longer-term aspects – primarily linked to the allocation of hydropower over the 
year. This is the issue of the long-term model.  
 
This document describes the idea and present status of the development of the 
long-term model.  
 
The traditional formulation of the hydro scheduling problem is as a staged stochas-
tic optimisation problem, or as an optimal control problem. The stages are typically 
months or weeks. The dominant stochastic element is the hydro inflow, however, 
other components may be incorporated, in particular, wind power if large amounts 
of capacity is installed.  
 
It is expected that for the Wilmar project, the week will be taken as the time step in 
the definition of the stages.  
 
The development of the long-term model will be done in phases, starting small and 
improving. A one storage program is presently under development.  
Present Implementation of the One Storage Program (the HYSP Module) 
The implementation is done within the Balmorel framework. It is expected that 
minor changes will be necessary in order to accommodate the program within the 
Wilmar model since the Balmorel model was used as starting point in the Wilmar 
project. All coding was done in the GAMS modelling language. 
 
A standard backwards-stochastic dynamic programming method is applied. The 
basic time step is given by the seasons. It is assumed that the stochastic elements 
are the inflow to the hydro reservoirs, and that the inflows are independent between 
seasons. For each season, the decision on the quantity of hydropower production 
has to be decided before the observation of the stochastic inflow. However, it re-
quires only minor changes in order to implement the version with decision after the 
observation.  
 
The present implementation uses an approximation so that only one reservoir is 
considered, representing the total reservoir volume in the simulated countries. 
Hence the name 'HYSP' is used, to indicate 'HYdro Single Price' (or 'HYdro Sys-
tem Price' since the model was developed for the Nord Pool area where 'system 
price' indicates the electricity price that would apply if there were no transmissions 
limitations). 
 
The aggregated reservoir is defined and analysed as follows. All hydro reservoirs 
in the simulated countries are aggregated to one reservoir with volume equal to the 
sum of the individual volumes. All hydro inflows are aggregated to one inflow 
equal to the sum of the individual inflows. All transmission capacities are set to 
infinity.  
 
The next step is to calculate total system costs. The total cost is the sum of con-
sumers’ and producers’ surplus. If demand were inelastic, the costs may be the to-
tal cost of production on all units except hydro units. These costs are calculated for 
a number of relevant quantities of hydro production in each season (month or 
week). The production levels are discredited using levels of equal distance 
HYSPLMWH (MWh). 
 
A backward stochastic dynamic programming is now performed. For this reservoir, 
the volume is discretised into levels with equal distance HYSPLMWH. The stochas-
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tic inflow is similarly discretised into equal levels of HYSPLMWH. The stochastic 
inflow to reservoirs could also advantageously include any other stochastic energy 
production such as wind. However, this is not presently implemented. 
 
The dynamic programming minimises the total expected costs over one year in the 
countries simulated.  
 
The calculation is in two parts. The first part calculates the total cost for each sea-
son corresponding to different levels of hydro production in the season (this was 
described above). The second part combines these costs with stochastic hydro in-
flows and hydro reservoir volumes in a backwards-stochastic dynamic program to 
find the solution that provides the minimum of expected costs.  
 
The optimal production levels of hydro corresponding to each season and reservoir 
level in the aggregated reservoir are thus found. The optimal production levels of 
all other technology types associated with each level of hydro production are pre-
viously known. Furthermore, the expected marginal costs may be found in the dy-
namic programming. They represent the water values or electricity prices. 
 
In a forward simulation based on assumptions of hydro inflow, the development of 
reservoir volume season by season, production (hydro and other types) and water 
values is calculated.  
Limitations in the Present Implementation 
The limitations of the present implementation of the one storage model are mainly 
related to the treatment of stochastic elements other than hydro inflow. In particu-
lar, it is not considered that wind power may be stochastic. In order to improve on 
this, two parts of the algorithm need consideration. One is the generation of the 
stochastics of wind power in a way that is consistent with the stochastics of the hy-
dro inflow. This is mainly a data problem. The other is in the forward simulation 
where wind power should influence the amount of hydropower to be used during a 
week. Some consideration and coding will be needed, however, it is believed that 
this is a relatively minor part.  
 
Apart from this, some cleaning up of the code is necessary, together with documen-
tation relating thereto.  
 
Test Runs and Observations  
The model has been preliminarily tested using the Balmorel model for the  
description of the deterministic parts of the supply, transmission and demand sys-
tems. The hydropower availability, in particular the stochastic elements  
related to this, was estimated using Nordel monthly data for the period 1990 
through to 2002 (from www.nordel.org). Basic functionality of the model seems 
confirmed.  
 
The dominating part in the calculation time for the above implementation of the 
one reservoir problem is the calculation of production costs for given quantities of 
hydropower production. In part, this is due to GAMS requiring generation of a new 
model for each allocation of hydropower production. The dynamic programming, 
algorithm, is not particularly time-consuming.  
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It is believed that the relation between the two parts will remain true when the code 
is enlarged to convene more than one hydro reservoir, so that the calculation of 
production cost dominates the calculation time. 
 
However, total calculation time will increase dramatically. When the code is 
enlarged to convene more than one hydro reservoir, both parts of the calculations 
(to find the production costs for different quantities of hydro production and to 
combine them in the dynamic programming algorithm), and the number of combi-
nations to analyse will grow exponentially with the number of reservoirs.  
 
There seems to be no way of avoiding this as a worst-case characteristic, i.e., it is a 
property of the problem, which is not of the applied solution method.   
 
The strategies for mitigating this are legio. Some of them are Monte Carlo simula-
tion, sampling, development of good stopping criteria, application of knowledge of 
the system (to eliminate irrelevant calculations), advanced use of computer tech-
nique, etc.  
 
It has not at this moment been decided which strategy to use. However, it seems 
likely that dynamic programming will be attempted, probably in combination with 
some of the strategies mentioned.  
 
Integration of the Long-Term Model and the Joint Market Model  
There is a close relationship between the long-term model and the joint market 
model, and their mutual dependencies must be established in calculation routines.  
 
The joint market model provides production costs based on a calculation on a de-
tailed hourly model. The daily or weekly production costs are necessary input to 
the long-term model, as explained above. On the other hand, calculations over a 
short period of time (e.g., a week), as in the joint market model, are only possible if 
boundary conditions for beginning and end of the period of time are provided. This 
applies, in particular, to the hydropower with storage.  
 
Such boundary conditions are supplied by the long-term model in the form of water 
values for the hydro production system or in the form of weekly hydro production 
quantities.  
 
The calculation routines for this interplay between the two models will be  
established in the next phases of the project. 
 
4.5 Joint Market Model 
Functionality 
The Joint Market model simulates a perfect market place with four types of prod-
ucts: day-ahead market power, district and process heat, regulating power and an-
cillary services. The actors on the market place maximise their profit through trade 
on the day-ahead market, the intra-day market and the ancillary services market. 
Due to the perfect market assumption, this is equivalent to maximising the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus. For all operational hours in a bidding period on the 
day-ahead market, the Joint Market model optimises the sum of the consumers’ 
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and producers’ surplus on the heat markets, the day-ahead market and the intra-day 
market. The optimisation is done subject to different constraints such as transmis-
sion constraints in the electricity system and capacity constraints of storage and 
generating technologies. The Joint Market model is a stochastic linear program-
ming model where the optimisation is done subject to a stochastic regulation need 
on the intra-day market. The first version of the Joint Market model only considers 
the contribution of the wind power production to the stochastic regulation need, but 
later versions can include other stochastic parameters such as the power demand.  
 
The model output consists of: 
 
• Day-ahead market production plan for the next bidding period, i.e., how much 
to produce on the different generating units according to the market clearance 
on the day-ahead market; 
• Hourly day-ahead market prices in each region; 
• Hourly transmission between each region; 
• Regulating power capacities and regulation power prices in each hour in the 
bidding period; 
• Distribution of ancillary services on power plants. 
Geography 
The geographical resolution chosen for the Joint Market model has direct implica-
tions for the data to be collected and the level of detail for analyses using the Joint 
Market model. 
 
The geographical resolution chosen for the model defines the spatial distribution of 
power plants, the consumption, storages, etc. The transmission grid representation 
in the model is constrained by the overall geographical resolution chosen. 
 
The Joint Market model uses the same basic type of geographical units as the Bal-
morel model, namely: countries, regions and areas.  
 
The relations between these geographical entities are such that a region contains 
areas, and a country contains regions, cf. Figure 26. Areas may be further subdi-
vided into urban and rural areas. The endogenous and exogenous variables will be 
specified and generated relative to the geographical entities. 
 
The regions are introduced to handle electricity transmission aspects and corre-
spond to bidding areas as seen on the Nord Pool market. The distribution of elec-
tricity within a given region is not included in the model13, but different regions can 
exchange power. The ability within regions of (or the requirements to) the electric-
ity grid in terms of supporting the scenarios focused on must be handled via other 
model tools (WP5 covers these parts of the analyses).  
 
The areas are the smallest geographical entities. The data given at the level of areas 
include those related to heat demand and heat distribution. 
 
                                                     
13 At least only as a distribution loss factor and a distribution tariff. 
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Figure 26: Illustration of the geographical entities and the transmission 
possibilities [Ravn  et al. 2001]. 
 
Table 8 shows the imagined geographical resolution of the data. 
 
Table 8: The suggested geographical level of the data 
 Area Region Country 
Data - Data related to heat demand 
- Data related to heat distribu-
tion 
- Storage and generation tech-
nology data 
- Some fuel prices and fuel 
potentials 
- Data related to electricity de-
mand 
- Data related to electricity 
transmission and distribution 
- Transmission technology data 
- Water inflow, wind speeds, 
solar radiation 
- Political data 
- Some fuel 
prices 
 
 
Countries covered in the Joint Market model are: 
 
• Denmark 
• Finland 
• Germany 
• Norway 
• Sweden 
 
The data given at country level describe overall economic aspects. 
 
At Nord Pool bottlenecks in the transmission grid can be handled either by the 
formation of price areas or via buy-back mechanisms (see Section ??). Further-
more, the geographical coverage and number of price areas at Nord Pool changes 
from time to time. The Joint Market model uses regions, which correspond to fixed 
price areas, in order to treat bottlenecks in the transmission grid.  
 
Sweden, which uses the buy-back mechanism, has been divided into three  
regions corresponding approximately to Svenska Kraftnäts Snit 2 (dividing South 
Sweden from middle Sweden) and Snit 4 (dividing middle Sweden from North 
Sweden). Denmark is divided into two regions corresponding to West Denmark 
(the Eltra region) and East Denmark (the Elkraft System region). Finland is divided 
into one region and Norway is divided into three regions. Finally, Germany is di-
vided into three regions. 
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The definition of areas in each region within the Joint Market model is a compli-
cated and still not completed task depending on the availability of heat  
demand data, the differences between CHP technologies within regions, the differ-
ences in heat demand profiles within a region and calculation time considerations. 
 
The exchange of power with regions that are not part of the model (third-party 
countries) can be represented with price-quantity curves. Through these curves, the 
amount of exchangeable power dependent on the power price is modelled as 
sketched in Figure 27. 
 
Quantity
General case: price-
quantity curve
Special case: quantity constraint
Price
Special case: exchange price at
border
Figure 27: Modelling of exchange with third-party countries using price-quantity 
curves. 
Time 
The finest time resolution in the Joint Market model is one hour. This is in line 
with the functioning of the present day-ahead market(s).  
 
The regulating power markets operated by Nordic TSO’s operate today at a time 
resolution lower than the hour. The difference between the regulating needs within 
one hour, e.g., from one quarter to the next, and the regulating needs from one hour 
to the next must be investigated, so that we know how much we underestimate the 
regulating power needs when operating at an hour-to-hour level. This issue will be 
investigated in the Wilmar project. 
Decision Structure 
In any model, it is important to understand the decision/stage structure of the prob-
lem, i.e., when must decisions be taken, and when does new information arrive that 
enables new and improved decisions to be taken?  
 
At Nord Pool, bids for the Elspot market must be each day delivered at noon 
thereby covering the production hours of the next day, i.e., a 24 hour day-ahead 
market bidding period with a time lag of 12 hours between bid submission and start 
of the day-ahead market bidding period. Approximately two hours  
following bid submission, Nord Pool has cleared the Elspot market and returned 
the amounts sold to and bought from each actor for each hour in the day-ahead 
market bidding period (see Figure 28).  
 
Operated by the TSO’s, a regulating power market runs in parallel with the day-
ahead market where bids for up or down regulation to be activated in the actual 
operation hour must be submitted one hour before the actual hour. The TSO can 
activate the up or down-regulation bids with a 15 minutes notice, i.e., the time reso-
lution in the regulating power market is below one hour. The bids submitted to the 
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regulating power market must take the obligations from the day-ahead market into 
account, i.e., the amounts sold/bought on the day-ahead market influences what can 
be offered on the regulating power market. 
Bid on the 
reg. market
for hour 2
And so on...
Reg. plan
for hour 2
Reg. plan
for hour 1
Bid on the
reg. market
for hour 1
Plan made
by NordPool
for 24 hours
Bid on spot market
considering the
reg. market
241LATERNOW Hour
Figure 28: Illustration of the time structure of the bidding procedures on the Elspot 
market at Nord Pool and the regulating power markets in the Nordic countries 
[Nielsen 2003]. 
 
New information arrives on a continuous basis and consists of updated information 
about the operational status of production and storage units, the operational status 
of the transmission and distribution grid, updated demand for heating, electricity 
demand and wind power production forecasts and updated information about day-
ahead market and regulating power market prices. Most actors only have access to 
a limited subset of this information, e.g., an actor only knows the detailed opera-
tional status of units owned by him. 
 
Furthermore, because of time-overlapping restrictions, such as storages (heat, elec-
tricity), water reservoirs and start/stop times and costs, the operation  
strategy of a unit needs to be simultaneously decided upon for several production 
hours. 
 
All in all, a producer with flexible production units making bids to the day-ahead 
market faces a quite difficult decision problem, because of time-overlapping re-
strictions on the production output and because the expected profit from participat-
ing in the regulating power market in the production hours in the day-ahead market 
bidding period also need to be taken into account. This decision problem can be 
formulated mathematically as a multi-stage, stochastic optimisation problem. 
Multi-stage because bids to the regulating market are made each hour and the day-
ahead market bidding period covers 24 hours, and stochastic because the regulating 
need in a given operation hour is stochastic depending among other things on the 
accuracy of wind power production forecasts. 
 
Discrete approximations of the distributions of the stochastic parameters are stan-
dard in stochastic dynamic programming techniques and will also be employed in 
the Joint Market model. However, such discrete, stochastic optimisation models 
quickly become intractable, since the total number of scenarios has a double expo-
nential dependency in the sense that a model with k+1 stages, m stochastic parame-
ters, and n scenarios for each parameter (at each stage) leads to a model with a total 
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of scenarios. It has, therefore, been necessary to simplify the decision struc-
ture of the day-ahead market bids in the Joint Market model. 
kmns =
 
12 18 00 06 12 18 00
Rolling Planning Period 1: Day-
ahead market cleared
Rolling Planning Period 2
Rolling Planning Period 3
Rolling Planning Period 4
Stage 3Stage 1 Stage 2
Stage 3Stage 1 Stage 2
 
Figure 29: Illustration of the rolling planning and the decision structure in each 
planning period within a day. 
 
The first version of the Joint Market model is a three-stage model. The model steps 
forward in time using rolling planning with a 6-hour step. The decision structure in 
the Joint Market model is illustrated in Figure 29, which shows the scenario tree 
for four planning periods covering one day. For each rolling planning period, a 
three-stage, stochastic optimisation problem is solved having a deterministic first 
stage covering 6 hours, a stochastic second stage with three scenarios covering 6 
hours, and a stochastic third stage with 9 scenarios covering a variable number of 
hours according to the rolling planning period in question. In rolling planning pe-
riod 1, the production and consumption volumes on the day-ahead market are de-
termined. During the subsequent rolling planning periods, the production and con-
sumption variables on the day-ahead market are fixed on the values found in roll-
ing planning period 1, so that the obligations on the day-ahead market is taken into 
account when the optimisation of the intra-day trading takes place.  
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The optimisation done in planning period 1 determines the production, consump-
tion and prices on the intra-day market in hour 12 to 17. The optimisation done in 
planning period 2 determines the same for the hours 18-23, planning period 3 de-
termines the same for the hours 00 to 5 and finally, planning period 4 for the hours 
6 to 11.  
 
By stepping through the planning periods, the production, consumption, exchange 
and prices on the day-ahead, intra-day and ancillary services market are in this way 
determined for a given period of time. 
 
A scenario consists of a vector of wind power production forecasts for each region 
in the number of hours corresponding to the number of hours of the stage in ques-
tion. 
 
The functioning of the model with the implemented decision structure can be inter-
preted as one operator with full knowledge of the operational status of all units in 
the system trying to maximise the consumer and producer surplus in the market. 
When making bids to the day-ahead market (rolling planning period 1), the opera-
tor takes into account the intra-day market knowing that the production decisions 
related to the intra-day market can be changed twice during the day-ahead market 
period, namely 6 hours and 12 hours after submitting the bids to the day-ahead 
market. Furthermore, the wind power production in the first 6 hours is with cer-
tainty known, but subsequent hours have uncertain wind power production. After 
having received information about day-ahead market production and consumption 
volumes, the operator re-optimises the production decision on the intra-day market 
every 6 hours having the traded volumes on the day-ahead market as restrictions in 
the optimisation. 
Bid Strategy of Consumers and Producers 
The trading rules on the day-ahead market are relatively simplified to those exist-
ing on the Nord Pool in that only so-called hourly bids are handled in the model 
(see Section 2). 
 
A power plant or group of power plants will for each hour in a given day-ahead 
market bidding period make a bid with the bid price equal to the short-term mar-
ginal production costs of the power plant or group of power plants in question. The 
short-term marginal production costs also include a simplified representation of 
start/stop costs meaning that the production costs also depend on the status of the 
power plant in the previous hours. 
 
The amount offered in the bid will be the maximum capacity available in the pro-
duction hour when different technical restrictions are taken into account minus the 
capacity that it is optimal to reserve for making up-regulation bids at the intra-day 
market minus for some units what it is optimal to reserve to providing ancillary 
services. The technical restrictions that are taken into account are minimum and 
maximum capacities, ramp rates14, minimum operation times, minimum shutdown 
times, and for backpressure and extraction CHP plants, the connections between 
heat and power production in the form of cb and cv lines. Minimum capacities, 
minimum operation times and minimum shutdown times are modelled with a sim-
plified approach so that the Joint Market model can be kept as a linear program-
ming model. 
 
                                                     
14 A restriction on how fast the power production can change from one hour to the next. 
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The supply curve on the day-ahead market in a given hour is made by aggre 
gating all production units after increasing price, thereby forming a piece-wise lin-
ear supply curve. 
If we knew the willingness to pay and the electricity demand of all consumers for 
each hour during a year, price flexible demand curves could be constructed in a 
similar fashion as the supply curves by aggregating the buy bids after decreasing 
willingness to pay. As this information is not available, a price flexible demand 
curve is constructed by combining a nominal electricity consumption with a piece-
wise linear electricity function with a given number of steps.  
 
In a situation without transmission restrictions in the system, the cross between the 
supply curve on the day-ahead market constructed in the above-mentioned fashion 
and the demand curve on the day-ahead market determines the electricity price for 
the hour in question and all sale and buy bids on the left of the market cross are 
accepted and turned into production and consumption obligations in that hour. 
 
After determination of production and consumption volumes on the day-ahead 
market, the remaining available capacity will be offered to the intra-day market, 
again taking the above-mentioned technical restrictions into account. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This report treats two overall fundamental issues of importance for the Wilmar-
project: 1) The functioning of the power markets in the Nordic countries and Ger-
many and 2) how a power market can be modelled within the Wilmar-modelling 
concept.  
 
With regard to the description of the power markets, the different reserve power 
types and physical energy markets that are present in Germany and the Nordic 
countries are summarised in the table below. As shown quite a number of different 
markets exist making the analysis of power markets quite complicated. Some mar-
kets, e.g., the Elspot market at Nord Pool are common for all Nordic countries (ex-
cept Iceland), while the functioning of others are specific for each country or TSO 
area, e.g., the way adequate amounts of primary reserves are secured by the TSO. 
The terminology used for different types of reserve power also differs between 
Germany and the Nordic countries. It is not possible to include all power markets 
in the Planning tool due to calculation time considerations, so a subset of the exist-
ing markets has been carefully selected to be included in the Planning tool as pre-
sented below. 
Table 9 Overview of the reserve power types and markets in Germany and the 
Nordic countries. The ancillary services are described with normal text style and 
the markets connected to the provision of ancillary services with the text in italics. 
The energy markets are described with normal text style. 
Reserves, by Acti-
vation 
Germany Nordic Countries 
Frequency Primary 
Public auction, 6 months 
before covering 6 months 
ahead 
 
Primary  
Momentary disturbance 
Capacity reserved using agreements 
between TSO’s and certain produc-
ers, different arrangements for dif-
ferent countries 
Automatic load flow Secondary 
Public auction, 6 months 
before covering 6 months 
ahead 
 
Manual, 15 min Minute reserves (also called 
Tertiary) 
Day-ahead market: Capacity 
price (if selected) + Energy 
price (if activated) 
 
Fast reserves (also called: Regulat-
ing power, 
Secondary) 
Regulating power market: TSO’s 
buy regulation, Capacity reserved 
for making bids at this market 
months ahead (reserve capacity 
market) 
Manual, hours Existing as OTC-market; 
responsibility with Gencos, 
not with TSO’s 
Tertiary 
Energy markets, by (approximate) time to delivery: 
Day-ahead EEX Day-ahead, often 
called Spot market 
Nord Pool Elspot, often called Spot 
market 
Balancing market Almost non-existing (only 
OTC) 
Nord Pool Elbas (only S + F), Hour-
ahead market 
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The second part of the report gives an overview over power market models used in 
the literature, and presents two power market models that will be implemented in 
the Planning tool developed in the Wilmar project. The Long-Term model handles 
the distribution of hydropower production and the distribution of CO2 emissions 
during a year taking the stochasticity of water inflow into  
account. Day-ahead markets for electricity, district heating and industrial process 
heat are represented in the Long-term model with a more coarse time resolution 
than the hourly time steps used in the real markets. The Joint Market model has an 
hourly time resolution and includes the following markets: 
 
• Day-ahead market for electricity and heat, price flexible demand. 
• Intra-day (regulating power) market with price inflexible demand. 
• Ancillary services market i.e. market for automatic activated reserves (fre-
quency and load flow) with price inflexible demand. 
 
It takes the stochasticity of wind power production into account when optimising 
the trade on these markets. 
 
The next steps to be taken on the project are to implement the first versions of the 
Long-Term model and the Joint Market model in the modelling language GAMS, 
which are expected to be finished at the beginning of 2004. The corresponding data 
collection has also shown good progress and a nearly complete data set will be 
available within the same timeframe. Thus, the testing phase of the Planning tool is 
expected to start in early Spring with the goal of presenting the first results from 
calculations with the Planning tool before Summer 2004.  
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